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Abstract 
The research focused on the impact pandemic influenza could have on K-12 
school systems. The research looked at responses of school leaders regarding the 
pedagogical, community health. social, and economic impacts of a pandemic. During an 
influenza pandemic school districts may be asked to close for as long as 12 \'>'eeks to 
reduce contact among children and stop the spread of disease. School superintendents· 
perceptions and attitudes were ought regarding school policy implications associated 
with Jong-term closure of K-12 school districts. The research methods used for this study 
included: (a) electronic survey. (b) face-to-face interviews, and (c) focus group. 
Information and data were collected and examined from 19 school districts within two 
Board of Cooperat ive Educational Services (BOCES) supervisory districts. The research 
findings are being used to inform school and public health officials of the perceptions 
school dist1ict superintendents have regarding the potential for long-tem1 school closure 
due to pandemic inOuenza. Key findings were (a) school superintendents do not have a 
clear understanding of who has the authority to close all county schools in the event of a 
pandemic, (b) school superintendents are essentially equally divided on whether or not a 
school board pol icy on extended school closure is needed. and (c) over 50% of the 
superintendents were not sure or did not believe BOCES should coordinate a task force to 
address the issue of pandemic in lluenza planning in schools. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
This research looks at what one might call --good old fashioned public health'". 
That is, if someone is infectious. do not let them give it to someone else. It is all about 
prevention. The dissertation describes a potential human biological disaster that appears 
likely to occur. The impact that a deadly disease could have on schools, the public, 
county, state, country and world could be devastating. 
The United States Department of Education website 
http://v-.ww.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/pandemic/indcx.html. February 
14, 2008, page I, indicates that scientists predict that the world is due for an influenza 
pandemic, a global outbreak from a new strain of influenza. The threat of a human 
influenza pandemic has greatly increased over the past several years with the emergence 
of highly virulent avian influenza viruses, notably H51 1 viruses, which have infected 
humans in several Asian and European countries (Fauci, 2006). The symptoms of avian 
influenza in humans are typical flu-like symptoms of high fever, headache, muscle aches, 
and prostration (Fauci, 2006). In many of the cases, a rapidly advancing lung and 
pulmonary involvement occurs causing respiratory tract disease, difficulty breathing, and 
that is generally the cause of death. or a contributing cause of death among those people 
who have actually died from avian flu (Fauci, 2006). Therefore, avian influenza has some 
of the standard flu- like symptoms, but it rapidly assumes a very sudden, intense and 
severe course. leading to serious illness and sometimes death of individuals. 
Previous influenza pandemics have arrived with little or no warning, but the 
current widespread circulation of HSN I viruses among avian populations and their 
potential for increased transmission to humans and other mammalian species may afford 
us an unprecedented opportunity to prepare for the next pandemic threat (Fauci, 2006). 
Recent human deaths due to infection by highly pathogenic (HSN I) avian influenza A 
virus have raised the vision of a devastating pandemic like that of 1918, should this avian 
virus change to become readily transmissible among humans. 
School and community leaders today have trouble handling their day-to-day 
problems. Who has lime to contend with. --what ifsT What if a pandemic influenza like 
that of 1918 occurred today? Staying ahead of potential disasters is all about a type of 
emergency planning. This planning is similar to buying life insurance. helping to save 
lives when an unexpected yet predictable event occurs (e.g., pandemic influenza). 
Scientists predict that mother-nature will likely produce a pandemic that will impact all 
lives; therefore plaiming is critical. The question is when and how se,·ere the pandemic 
might be? 
Planning for an influenza pandemic in the 21 ''century is a public health issue that 
will require a federal, state and community-wide response. Responding to a pandemic 
will involve the activation of the emergency response system by federal, state ai1d county 
public health officials. In a county containing a large city in upstate New York pandemic 
response will be organized using a national disaster preparedness Incident Management 
System (IMS) All-Ha::ards approach model as would be used for biopreparedness. The 
IMS All-Hazards approach model may also be used for planning and responding to many 
hazards (e.g., chemical or radiation threats). 
Regardless of the response model. the dilemma faced by community leaders when 
it comes to planning for emergency preparedness is engaging people. It is difficult to 
engage people when there is no problem yet. Community leaders clearly cannot spend a 
tremendous amount of time dealing with potential problems when they have urgent and 
important day-to-day issues that become priorities. However, planning is needed, 
especially in schools, where extended school closures, (e.g. up to 12 weeks) to prevent 
the spread of disease. may be required. This could pose a host of policy, procedural and 
practical problems. 
This research focused on the impact a pandemic influenza event could have on K-
12 school systems. It examined school planning decisions. and policy issues related to 
extended school closure due to pandemic influenza. The need for school planning and 
policies has been examined to help establish a seamless response across the region 
between school districts and public health authorities. The research looked at responses 
school leaders may take to reduce the pedagogical, community health. social. and 
economic impacts of a pandemic. The goal of the study was to examine K-1 2 school 
planning and policy issues addressing the topic of extended school closures due to 
pandemic influenza. 
Statement of the Problem 
The research problem statement is put forward as a research question. The 
research question is: What are the perceptions of school superintendents and a 
community task force regarding the health. pedagogical, social. and economic planning 
and policy decisions for long-term school closure due to pandemic influenza? 
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The researcher gathered specific input to help formulate local and regional school 
community containment and preparedness policy. The research identified specific 
mechanisms to raise the awareness of the importance of school closing as a means to 
counter the spread of pandemic influenza across the community as a whole with the 
intent of minimizing the negative impacts that may result from school closure. The 
research describes the status of current plans to address school closings. It also identifies 
opportunities to improve the coordination between public health, education and 
emergency preparedness partners. 
Holmberg, S.D., Layton, C.M., Ghneim, G.S. and Wagener, D.K (2006) arc 
concerned that state pandemic plans in the United States represent a patchwork without 
central coordination or direction. Their concerns are especially pertinent for school 
closure decisions during an influenza pandemic. The US Department of Health and 
Human Services' (OHH) checklist (2006) regarding school closures is ambiguous and 
illustrates shortcomings in the literature by offering confl icting messages regarding 
school closure recommendations. For example, it recommends that schools stay open 
during a pandemic and develop school-based surveillance systems for absenteeism of 
students and sick-leave policies for staff and students. It also recommends developing 
alternate procedures to ensure the continuity of instruction in the event of district-wide 
school closures. These unclear recommendations may point toward the lack of data to 
advise school closure. 
A great deal has been written on the topic of pandemic influenza preparedness. 
This paper focuses on a smaller number of conceptual pieces within that topic. The study 
will be limited to school planning decisions and policy issues related to long-term closure 
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of schools due to a pandemic influenza event. It will focus on four decision making and 
policy areas related to long-term closure of schools including: (a) community health 
implications, (b) pedagogical implications, (c) social implications, and (d) economic 
implications. In support of this topic the literature suggests that an uncoordinated 
approach for communjty response measures, such as school closure decisions, could 
jeopardize efforts in containing a deadly pandemic (Kahn LH, 2007). 
Sign(/icance of the Study 
Public health revolves a great deal around prevention of disease. Most known 
influenza strains are currently preventable through vaccination. However, scientists are 
concerned that new strains arc resisting currently recommended antibiotics. The last 
pandemic, named the Hong Kong flu, occurred almost 30 years ago in 1968. An 
influenza pandemic is a global outbreak of a new type of an influenza virus that is easily 
transmitted from human to human. ln a severe pandemic like that of 1918, 1 ew York 
State could expect to see 153.000 deaths and 771.000 hospital admissions. The demands 
on health care systems will be huge. Continuity of operations will be challenging 
considering there will be 1/3 staff absenteeism. The impact on schools will be enormous. 
They will likely have to close for weeks or months to help prevent the spread of disease. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to exam school leaders· decision making issues that 
relate to pandemic preparedness and to gather info1mation on what is going on. School 
and community leaders will need to understand during a pandemic who does what, who 
has the authority, and who is in charge. Often, leaders and people in general, arc reactive 
to day-to-day difficulties. They rarely set aside time to plan for potential future 
5 
problems. Planning is needed when predicting the impact a future pandemic could have 
on public schools. The information collected will be used to help detennine school 
planning and policy issues. It will identify how communications will talce place within 
local school distiicts and between schools, health. and emergency management 
authorities. 
Research Question 
The research question is: What are the perceptions of school superintendents and 
a community task fo rce regarding the health. pedagogical, social, and economic planning 
and policy decisions for long-tenn school closure due to pandemic influenza? 
The literature and research studies cited in this paper build a rationale for why the 
research topic is important. The dissertation topic relates to planning and policy 
development for pandemic influenza mitigation in elementary and secondary schools. 
Local educational agencies (LEAs) play an inte!:,rral role in protecting the health and 
safety of their district's staff, students and their families. The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have 
developed a checklist (2006) to assist LEAs in developing and improving plans to 
prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. The efficacy of recommended policies 
and procedures associated with: (a) planning and coordination, (b) continuity of student 
learning. pedagogy and core operations. (c) infection control policies and procedures, and 
(d) communications planning, are addressed. The research is needed to validate proposed 
interventions. assess their effectiveness. and identify adverse consequences. 
School districts within a northeastern county in New York State will be used to 
examine a local school community"s process for developing rational, coherent. and 
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coordinated school closure plans to protect children and the school community during an 
influenza pandemic. 
limitations of the Study 
The research has been limited to perceptions and attitudes of school 
superintendents and a community task force in a northeastern county in upstate New 
York. It focused on school planning and policy issues related to long-tenn closure of 
schools due to pandemic influenza. The implications that have been exam ined include 
community health, pedagogical, social and economic. 
Definitions of Terms 
Antiviral 
A vi an Influenza 
Bird Flu 
Epidemic 
Flu 
Antiviral 
H5NI 
Influenza 
Influenza Pandemic 
Isolation 
Pandemic 
Pandemic Influenza 
Quarantine 
Seasonal Influenza 
Social Distancing 
Vaccine 
A medication that may be used to treat people who have been 
infected by a virus to help limit the impact of some symptoms 
and reduce the potential for serious complications. People 
who are in high-risk groups are often given antiviral drugs 
because of their increased potential to develop additional 
health issues (American Red Cross. 2007). 
Avian Influenza (bird flu) Commonly known as bird flu, this strain of influenza virus is 
naturally occurring in birds. Wild birds can carry the vims 
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Epidemic 
HSN ! 
Influenza (flu) 
Influenza Pandemic 
Isolation 
and may not get sick from it; however. domestic birds may 
become infected by the virus and often die from it. It is not 
easily transmitted to humans (American Red Cross, 2007) ... 
The rapid spread of a disease that infects some or many 
people in a community or region at the same time (American 
Red Cross, 2007). 
The scientific name for a subtype of the a\"ian influenza (bird 
flu) virus that has spread from birds to humans. Diffcrenl 
proteins on the virus classify the scientific names for these 
subtypes. New subtypes naturally occur when the proteins 
change (American Red Cross, 2007). 
A contagious respiratory illness caused by particular strains 
of viruses (American Red Cross. 2007). 
A global outbreak of the influenza disease that occurs when a 
new influenza virus appears in the human population. 
Because people have little or no immunity to the new strain, 
serious illness can ol:cur, and the virus can spread easily and 
rapidly from person to person with no vaccine immediately 
available (American Red Cross, 2007). 
The physical separation of a person suffering from an 
infectious or contagious disease from others in a community 
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Pandemic 
Pandemic Influenza 
Quarantine 
Seasonal Flu 
Social Distancing 
(American Red Cross, 2007). 
An outbreak of a disease that affects large numbers of people 
throughout the world (American Red Cross, 2007). 
A virulent influenza (flu) caused by a new flu virus strain to 
which humans have not been exposed. It is more serious than 
a typical seasonal flu because there is no natural resistance or 
immunity to it and infects large numbers of people of 
different ages all over the world, causing serious illness and 
possibly death (American Red Cross, 2007). 
The physical separation of healthy people who have been 
exposed to an infectious disease, for a period of time, from 
those who have not been exposed (American Red Cross, 
2007). 
A contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza (fl u) 
viruses occurring every year. It affects an average of 5 to 20 
percent of the U.S. population by causing mild to severe 
illness, and in some instances can lead to death. Most people 
have some immunity. and a vaccine is available (American 
Red Cross. 2007). 
A disease prevention strategy in which a community imposes 
limits on social (face-to-face) interaction to reduce exposure 
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Vaccine 
to and transmission of a disease. These limitations could 
include, but are not limited to, school and work closures, 
cancellation of public gatherings and closure or limited mass 
transpo11ation (American Red Cross, 2007). 
An injection, usually of an innocuous (weak or killed) form 
of the virus, which stimulates the production of antibodies by 
the immune system to help prevent or create resistance to an 
infection. Vaccines are usually given as a preventive measure 
(American Red Cross, 2007). 
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Chapter 11: Review of the Literature 
!ntroduction and Pi11pose 
The literature builds a rationale for why this research is important. The 
dissertation topic attempts to answer the question: What are the perceptions of school 
superintendents and a community task force regarding the health, pedagogical, social, and 
economic planning and policy decisions for long-term school closure due to pandemic 
influenza? The topic examines the efficacy of recommended policies associated with 
long-term public school closures. While a great deal has been written on the topic of 
pandemic influenza, this paper focuses on the literature associated with a smaller number 
of conceptual pieces within that topic. The research is limited to school planning and 
policy issues related to long-term closure of schools due to pandemic influenza. Jt has 
focused on four school planning areas related to long-term closure of schools including: 
(a) planning and coordination, (b) continuity of student learning, pedagogy and core 
operations, (c) infection control policies and procedures, and (d) communications 
planning. In support of this topic, the literature suggests, "an uncoordinated approach for 
community response measures such as school closure decisions could jeopardize efforts 
in containing a deadly pandemic .. (Kahn, 2007, p 8). 
Historical Co111ext of Research 
To understand policy issues associated with an impending pandemic, one must 
understand what a pandemic is. A pandemic is closely related to an epidemic. Both 
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involve the occurrence of cases of disease in excess of what is usually expected fo r a 
given period of time. Confusion sometimes arises because of overlap between the terms, 
·'pandemic", "epidemic .. as well as other tenns like --outbreak .. and .. cluster'". Although 
closely related terms, an epidemic suggests problems that are geographically widespread, 
such as an entire state or region whereas a pandemic is a problem that has spread over a 
considerably larger geographic area; influenza pandemics are often global, (Goodman. 
2006). The te1ms "outbreak" and ·'cluster·· are reserved for problems spread over smaller 
areas (e.g., nursing homes, schools or daycare centers). An outbreak is a sudden rise in 
the incidence of a disease in a short period of time. whereas a cluster is a larger than 
expected nwnber of cases of disease (as leukemia) occurring in a particular locality, 
group of people. or period of time. 
An influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus emerges for which 
there is little or no immunity in the human population causing serious illness and then 
spreading easily person-to-person worJd,Yide (Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 2006). 
Pandemics, epidemics, outbreaks and clusters originate as a result of the interaction of 
three factors: (a) agent, (b) host, and (c) environment. Agents cause the disease (e.g., 
viruses). Hosts are susceptible to it (e.g .. people). Environmental conditions permit host 
exposure to the agent (e.g., crowded classrooms). Understanding the interaction among 
agent, host and environment is impot1ant when selecting the best practice to prevent or 
control the continued spread of the disease (Goodman. 2002). 
Spread of infectious disease depends primari ly on: (a) a source of the agent, (b) 
route of exit from the host, (c) a suitable mode of transmission between a susceptible host 
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and the source, and ( d) a route of entry into another susceptible host. Modes of disease 
spread are illustrated in Table I below. 
Table I 
Modes of Disease Spread Between il'!fected Host and Ne11· J/ost 
Direct 
Direct physical contact such as: 
Touching 
Sexual intercourse 
Airborne spread 
Coughing 
Sneezing 
Indirect 
Takes place through vehicles, such as: 
Contaminated water 
Food 
Inanimate objects 
Bedding 
Classroom surfaces and objects 
Seasonal influenza and pandemic influenza are different. Seasonal influenza 
epidemics are caused by viruses that mutate in small but important ways from year to 
year through a process known as antigenic drift (World Health Organization (WHO), 
2005). Pandemic influenza is caused by a virus that is dramatically different from those 
that have circulated previously. which can occur through a phenomenon referred to as 
antigenic shift (WHO, 2005). Such viruses can cause pandemics because few people or 
none at all, have had prior immunologic exposure to surface proteins of these viruses. ln 
a typical intcrpandemic influenza season. people may have some residual immunity from 
exposure to previously circulating influenza strains or from vaccinations (Couch, 2003). 
"'Many experts believe the question is not whether there will be another pandemic. 
but when, and which strain will it be .. (Harvard. 2006. p 8). Many people think of ··bird 
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flu"" as a potential source of a pandcrnic. Bird flu (also called avian flu) is a term used by 
different people to mean different things. Generally. bird flu refers to an illness in 
humans caused by an unusual type of influenza virus that normally just infects birds 
(Harvard, 2006, p 7). Most strains of bird influenza cannot infect humans, although a few 
strains have been able to do so. They have not been able to spread readily from person to 
person, which is how a pandemic would begin. Several flu viruses in fecting birds have 
caused illness in a fow humans in recent years. One of those viruses, cal led HSN I , is the 
focus of greatest concern. Evidence that the HS I virus may become a threat began to 
appear in 1997 (Harvard, 2006, p 8). A local outbreak on domestic poultry infected a few 
humans who handled sick birds. The infection was fatal in some of the birds and about 
half of the humans. Mi!Jions of poultry were slaughtered to prevent the v irus from 
spreading. In 2003 the H5N1 virus spread to wild migratory birds that carried the virus to 
poultry in several Asian countries. Currently, the HSN I virus is spreading easily from 
bird to bird, but not human to human. In May 2006. those cases that appeared to have 
spread from one person to another were reported in Indonesia (Harvard. 2006). 
While pandemics are rare they do occur. According to the CDC du1ing the 20111 
century there were three pandemics of influenza. The first influenza pandemic occurred 
in 1918 and caused over 500,000 U.S. deaths and close to 50 mill ion deaths worldwide. 
This pandemic had a 2% mortality rate. The second pandemic occurred in 1957 and 
caused over 70.000 U.S. deaths and 1-2 million deaths worldwide. The third influenza 
pandemic occurred in 1968 and caused nearly 34,000 U.S. deaths and 700,000 deaths 
worldwide. 
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During a pandemic an effective vaccine will not be available for several weeks or 
months. Decisions about how to protect the public before an effective vaccine is available 
need to be based on scientific data, ethical considerations, consideration of the public·s 
perspective of the protective measures and their impact on society. and common sense. 
Researchers have used retrospective data to answer the question: If pandemic flu were to 
emerge in the United States, what interventions might slow its spread and minimize its 
impact? 
Retrospective studies are the primary methodologies and research techniques used 
in the field to address the next influenza pandemic threat. Evidence to detennine the best 
strategies for protecting people during a pandemic is very limited (CDC. 2006). 
Retrospective data from past influenza pandemics and the conclusions drawn from those 
data are being examined and analyzed within the context of current society. An advantage 
of the retrospective studies is that researchers may use the data to fom1 theo1ies regarding 
planning assumptions. However. few of those assumptions may be entirely generalizable. 
When these theories are integrated into the current mathematical models, the limitations 
need to be recognized, as they were in a recent lnstitute of Medicine report (Institute of 
Medicine. 2006). With support from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). researchers 
from the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle, Washington, and the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory have used computer models to suggest possible answers 
regarding what interventions might slow the spread of an influenza pandemic and 
minimize the impact of it on the U.S. population. The findings were published in the 
April 1 I, 2006, issue of the Proceedings of rlze Narional Academy o.(Sciences. 
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The findings suggest that early, targeted social distancing measures such as long-
term school closures may slow the spread of disease, but only when used in conjunction 
with other social distancing interventions, such as restricting travel and quarantining 
households. The results showed that with no intervention a pandemic flu with low 
contagiousness could peak after 117 days and infect about 33 percent of the U.S. 
population. A highly contagious virus could peak after 64 days and infect about 54 
percent of people. 
The researchers compared what might happen in scenarios involving the use of 
different interventions. When the simulated virus was less contagious. the three most 
effective single measures included: (a) distributing several million courses of antiviral 
treatment to targeted groups seven days after a pandemic alert. (b) school closures. and 
(c) vaccinating I 0 million people per week with one dose of a poorly matched vaccine. 
The results also showed that vaccinating school children first is more effective than 
random vaccination when the vaccine supply is limited. Regardless of contagiousness. 
social distancing measures alone had little effect. But when the virus was highly 
contagious, all single intervention strategies left nearly half the population infected. In 
this instance, the only measures that reduced the number of cases to below the annual flu 
rate involved a combination of at least three different interventions, including a minimum 
of 182 million courses of antiviral treatment. 
In preparing for an influenza pandemic researchers have learned lessons from 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Recent experience with an outbreak of 
SARS serves as an instructive example in preparing for a potential influenza pandemic 
(Muller, 2004, Finlay. 2004). In 2002 SARS, a deadly respiratory disease emerged and 
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rapidly spread to Canada, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and other sites in China, resulting in 
over 8.000 cases and 750 deaths. The outbreak, which elicited a classic study in 
epidemiologic investigation with regard to identifying the point source, tracking the 
spread, and instituting containment measures, taught researchers many important lessons 
(Fauci, 2006). 
The etiologic agent of SARS, a previously unrecognized coronavirus, was 
identified in March 2003 sequenced within 2 weeks, and a vaccine candidate was 
developed by the follow·ing March. In December 2004, a clinical trial of a candidate 
SARS vaccine began at the National Institute of Health (NIH) Vaccine Research Center 
(Fauci, 2006). Because the SARS coronavirns is not as easily transmitted as influenza 
viruses, researchers do not know whether the actions that led to the containment of SARS 
would be as successful if an avian inOuenza virus acquired the ability to spread 
efficiently from person to person. However. scientists have an added advantage in 
preparing for pandemic influenza that they did not have with SARS. As noted. SARS is 
caused by a coronavirus that was unknown before the 2003 outbreak. In the cuITent 
situation, scientists have identified the HSN 1 virus as a likely contender for starting a 
pandemic. I lealth officials cannot be certain when the next influenza pandemic will 
emerge. or even whether it will be caused by H51 1 or an unrelated virus. They are 
ce1tain. however, that an influenza pandemic eventually will occur. 
Current Context ofResearch 
Holmberg et al. (2006) are concerned that state pandemic plans in the United 
States represent a ·'patchwork .. without central coordination or direction. These concerns 
are especially pertinent for school closure decisions during an influenza pandemic. Kahn 
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(2007) reports that there are only a few States and localities with pandemic influenza 
school closure policies. Table 2 below illustrates the number of States and localities 
currently with such policies. 
Table 2 
Pandemic h~/l11e11::a School Closure Policies - Number of stales reporting influenza 
pandemic school closure policies at various levels, USA* 
Region Local only State and local State only 
Northeast 4 2 0 
South 7 8 2 
Midwest 7 0 
West 4 3 4 
Totalt 22 16 6 
Nottheast: CT. DC. MA. ME. NH. NJ. NY, PA. RI, YT: South: AL, AR, DE, FL GA. KY. LA, MD, 
MS. NC. OK. SC. TN. TX. VA. WV: Midwest: lA. IL, IN. KS. Ml, M . MO. NO. NE, OH. SD. WI: 
West: AK. AZ. CA. CO, HI. ID. MT. m t. NY. OR. UT. WA. \VY. *Six states did not respond 
Since December 2003. HSN I avian influenza viruses have killed millions of 
domestic fowl in Southeast Asia and tens of millions more have been killed to prevent the 
spread of this disease. A vi an virus has infected over 130 people and ki llcd more than 70 
in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and China (WHO. 200S). These data 
indicate that the virus has produced more than a SO% mortality rate. The HSN l virus is 
not as contagious as the virus that caused the 1918 pandemic. but much more deadly. If 
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the HSN 1 virus obtains the ability to transmit readily among humans. an influenza 
pandemic could ensue, with the potential to kill millions of people (WHO, 2005). Reports 
in both the mainstream press (Spector, 2005) and scientific literature (Webby, 2003, 
Monto, 2005, Stohr, 2005) have raised fear in the United States and throughout the world. 
These fears have prompted federal, state and local governments to act and examine ways 
to reduce the impact of an influenza pandemic on the American public. In August, 2006, 
the New York State (NYS) Commissioners of Education and Health coauthored a letter 
to NYS School District Superintendents and School Board members asking them to work 
closely with their local health depa11ments to prepare schools for an influenza pandemic. 
In 2005 researchers from the National Institute of General Medical Sciences 
evaluated the effectiveness of different intervention strategies such as long-term school 
closure, by developing a model that represents the U.S. population and tests different 
properties of a potential pandemic flu virus. They found that, depending on the 
contagiousness of the virus, a variety of approaches may be taken to reduce the impact of 
an influenza pandemic such as: (a) isolate and treat all persons with confi rmed or 
probable pandemic influenza. (b) voluntary home quarantine of members of households 
with confirmed or probable influenza cases, ( c) dismissal of students from school for up 
to twelve weeks, and 4) use of social distancing measures to reduce contact between 
people in the community and workplace. Researchers believe these nonpharmaceutical 
interventions used together could significantly reduce the number of cases. 
On January 24, 2007, the ew York State Department of Health, New York State 
Education Department. and ew York State Emergency Management office sponsored a 
school closure discussion-based exercise workshop. Over 110 people from various 
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agencies and organizations participated. The workshop was designed to be a building 
block to serve as a catalyst for the Federal, State and Local planning processes. The 
specific objectives of the workshop were to: (a) gather specific input to formulate State 
and 1ational community containment preparedness policy and (b) to identify specific 
mechanisms to raise awareness of the importance of school closing as a means to counter 
the spread of pandemic influenza across the community as a whole, with the intent of 
minimizing the negative impacts that may result from school closure. Additional 
objectives of the workshop were to: (a) identify and discuss the responsibilities of all 
participating agencies. (b) describe the status of current plans to address school closings, 
and (c) identify opportunities to improve the coordination between education and 
preparedness partners. 
Information regarding the school closure discussion-based exercise workshop was 
obtained from the Initial Evaluation Summary completed to satisfy the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) exercise assessment requirement. A formal After Action Report 
(AAR). not available at the time of this writing, will also be compiled in accordance with 
the Homeland Secmity Exercise and Evaluation Program guidelines. Some of the key 
points mentioned in the January 24. 2007 workshop· s Initial Ern!uation Summary arc 
directly related to this dissertation topic. 
During the workshop it was reported that. ew York State's ·'trigger" to close 
schools in a severe pandemic influenza event is one laboratory confirmed community 
case in the county and schools would remain closed for l 2 weeks. A trigger may also 
take into account the severity or the epidemiology of the disease. as information becomes 
available. A need was identified that the trigger discussion needs to be held with local 
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health departments and communities, so that decisions can be made proactively rather 
than reactively. The legal authority to close school district schools remains with the 
superintendent of that district. It was suggested that participants for future exercises 
should include local school district representatives and school superintendents. 
The workshop identified unresolved issues regarding the worker· s right to refuse 
to work during a pandemic emergency, and the subsequent impact on compensation, as 
well as job security. During large-scale emergencies school closure decisions wil l be 
made at the State level through a multi-agency coordinated effort, s ince affected school 
districts will need regulatory relief to deal with the impact oflonger-tenn closures. 
School superintendents will make the decision to re-open schools with consultation and 
advice from the appropriate authorities. Re-opening schools and returning to a .. normal"' 
school day will require regulatory and procedural flexibi lity. There is a need to ensure 
that clear, scientific information regarding the decision to close is communicated to 
families, as well as what has been done to ensure that schools are ·'safe .. for children and 
staff to return. The effect of transmission rate on reopening of schools, once closed. is not 
clearly addressed in the scientific literature. 
During the workshop there was no clear response on the issue oflong-term 
closure on student progress for graduation. The Commissioner of Education can waive 
the 180-day requirement and year-end exams would depend on the timing of the 12-week 
closure. TI1ere was agreement that parents would need educational materials to address 
concerns about long-term disruption of instruction. Information to be provided should 
include how students lost time would be made up. There \:>.1as limited discussion on the 
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effect of long-tenn closure would have on school funding, with it noted that regulatory 
relief would be needed. 
Major issues identified during the workshop were provision of continuity of 
instruction and what is pe1missible under collective bargaining agreements. Alternative 
learning scenarios including web-based instruction. public television. and \.vritten 
educational resources for parents were di scussed. However. the issues were raised that: 
(a) not every household has internet access or even televis ion, (b) children who are sick 
or caring for sick family members will not likely take advantage of in-home instruction. 
even if it is available, and (c) the goal to provide home-bound chi ldren with formal 
instruction may not be realistic. It was mentioned that this might be an opportunity to 
educate children about civic responsibility . 
School-based feeding programs in New York State, which provide l.7 million 
lunches and 500,000 breakfasts of which more than 50% are free or reduced cost. would 
need to be curtailed. This was seen as a significant burden on families who depended on 
these meals for their children. and who otherwise do not have the financial resources to 
provide meals to their children. 
The interaction between local emergency planners and education authorities was 
not addressed in any detail. lt was suggested strongly that Jaw enforcement be invited to 
participate with schools in their planning efforts, as they will be impacted by school 
closure orders. There was agreement that community di scussion and public education 
efforts about school closure needed to start earl y, and be consistent. All participants felt 
that the --race of the message·· needed to be the public health community, with a concise 
and clear explanation of what school closure would mean, and why it might be employed 
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as a community containment measure. Finally, guidance on the economic and emotional 
impacts of school closure is needed. 
The prospect of pandemic influenza provides good reason to be concerned. Rather 
than react in panic. however, school district leaders need to determine what can be done 
now with the knowledge and resources currently available to prevent or minimize the 
impact of a potential pandemic. At the same time they must ask how they can help 
improve the school community's infrastructure and technology to prepare for future 
outbreaks. 
School Policy Implications - Planning and Coordination 
In their article, Influen::.a Preparedness Pla11ni11g. Cox. Tamblyn and Tam (2003) 
report that a future influenza pandemic is highly likely, if not inevitable. They note that 
over the last 5 years. considerable progress toward pandemic preparedness has been 
made. Several countries have produced valuable frameworks. models, guidelines. and 
action plans that can be used by other countries that are just beginning their planning 
efforts. ln spite of this progress, however, the world remains ill prepared for the next 
pandemic. Fewer than 30 countries have developed pandemic plans and only a handful 
has begun to translate their plans into policy decisions and concrete actions (Cox, et al. 
2003). Many obstacles to influenza pandemic planning remain. including a lack of 
appreciation of the pandemic threat, lack of resources and difficulties in gaining political 
and financial commitment. The best defense against the next pandemic will be to 
strengthen the local communities· capacity to respond to yearly epidemics of influenza. 
By building this capacity local communities will not only be better prepared for the next 
pandemic, but may also save thousands of Ii ves before it arrives. 
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Key messages from the Cox, ct al. (2003) study are relevant to school district 
planners who can learn from the findings. The researchers provided fi ve messages 
generated from their study. These messages were: (a) influenza pandemic preparedness 
planning is based on the 1999 WHO guidelines, and most national plans have adopted 
WHO·s phased approach to responding to a pandemic threat, (b) pandemic preparedness 
planning can be usefully linked to response planning for other public health emergencies, 
including biote1rnrism threats (c) regional and international coordination of responses to 
an influenza pandemic will be essential but plamung how to do this will be very difficult. 
(d) fewer than 30 countries have developed pandemic preparedness plans and only a 
handful have begun to translate them into policy decisions and concrete actions, and (e) 
the best defense against the next pandemic is to strengthen global vaccination programs 
in response to seasonal epidemics of influenza. 
Continuity o./ Student Leaming, Pedagogy and Core Operations 
Holmberg ct al.. 2006 are concerned that state pandemic plans in the United 
States arc pieced together without central coordination or direction. These concerns arc 
particularly relevant for school closure decisions during an influenza pandemic. The US 
Department of Health and Human Services· checklist regarding school closures gives 
conflicting messages (DHHS, Dec. 9, 2006). It recommends that schools stay open during 
a pandemic and develop school-based surveillance systems for absenteeism of students 
and sick-leave policies for staff and students. It also recommends developing alternate 
procedures to ensure the continuity o f instruction in the event of district-wide school 
closures. These vague recommendations may reflect the lack of data to recommend 
school closure. 
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b1fectio11 Co11trol Policies and Procedures 
Approximately 1/5 of the U.S. population attends or works in schools (CDC 
2004). Some viruses and bacteria can live from 20 minutes up to 2 hours or more on 
surfaces like cafeteria tables, doorknobs, and desks (CDC 2004). Nearly 22 million 
school days are lost annuaJly due to the common cold alone. (CDC, 2004). Addressing 
the spread of gem1s in schools is essential to the health of our youth, our schools, and our 
nation. School leaders will need to consider these facts when developing policies and 
procedures for long-term school closing in the event of an influenza pandemic. 
Communications Planning 
In January 2007 the New York State Department of Health released a publication 
titled: Pandemic FLU Action Kit/or Schools in Nett· York State. The kit was distributed to 
school Superintendents and others throughout New York State. The framework for the kit 
came from materials by the Contra Costa. CA. Health Services and the Contra Costa 
County Department of Education. Staff from the New York State Department of Health. 
the New York State Education Depatiment. and a working group representing local 
Health Departments in New York State developed the NYS action kit. 
According to the New York State Health Department the Pandemic FLU Action 
Kit for Schools in Nev.: York Staie reflects circumstances and planning assumptions 
specific to New York State. An example is that they expect school closures could last up 
to hvelvc weeks in an influenza pandemic. The kit includes many sample documents and 
templates. These may be adapted as necessary to meet local needs. School disbicts 
tlu·oughout New York State are expected to use the kit. 
Su111mct1)' a11d Conclusion 
According to the World Health Organization (2005) since late 2003, the world has 
moved closer to a pandemic than at any time since 1968, when the last of the previous 
century"s three pandemics occurred. /\II prerequisites for the start of a pandemic have 
now been met except for one: the establishment of efficient human-to-human 
transmission. During 2005, threatening changes have been observed in the epidemiology 
of the disease in animals. Human cases are continuing to occur, and the virus has 
expanded its geographical range to include ne\v countries, thus increasing the size or the 
population at risk. Each new human case gives the virus an opportunity to evolve towards 
a fully transmissible pandemic strain. 
Planning and preparedness for implementing mitigation strategies during a 
pandemic are complex tasks and will require participation by all levels of government 
and all segments of society (CDC. 2007). The candidate's dissertation topic involved 
action research related to school policy implications for long-term closure of elementary 
and secondary schools in the event of an influenza pandemic. The research is limited to 
school policy issues related to long-term closure of schools due to pandemic influenza. It 
focused on four school policy areas related to long-tem1 closure of schools including: (a) 
planning and coordination. (b) continuity of student learning, pedagogy and core 
operations, (c) infection control policies and procedures, and (d) communications 
planning. The study examined the cffecti veness of a local task force made up of school 
district representatives throughout the county while they develop rational, coherent, and 
coordinated school closure plans to protect children and communities during an influenza 
pandemic. 
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The dissertation focused on elementary and secondary school preparedness and 
closure recommendations. In the event of an influenza pandemic health officials will 
require school districts to dismiss students from school for as much as 12 weeks. The 
impact on the school community could be enonnous. For example. dismissal of students 
from school classrooms may lead to a cascading effect of workplace absenteeism for 
child minding. Workplace absenteeism could also lead to disruption of the delivery of 
goods and services essential to the viability of the community (CDC, 2007). 
This research is needed to val idate proposed interventions, assess their 
effectiveness. and identify adverse consequences. The literature suggests that an 
uncoordinated approach for community response measures such as school closure 
decisions could jeopardize efforts in containing a deadly pandemic (Kah11, 2007). 
The best defense against the next pandemic will be to strengthen the local 
communi ties· capacity to respond to yearly epidemics of influenza. By building this 
capacity local communities will not only be better prepared for the next pandemic, but 
may also save thousands of lives before it arrives. 
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Chapter Ill: Research Design Methodology 
Orerall Research Design 
The research involved a multi-method study including three research methods. 
The methods used for this study included: (a) survey, (b) interviews and (c) focus group. 
Creswell, (2003) describes research design methods as quantitative, qualitative, or mixed 
methods. Cottrell & McKenzie, (2005) state that: ··Either method allows the researcher 
to discover meaning in the absence of easily measurable or, even, fully definable 
variables." The research embodied both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Cottrell 
& McKenzie (2005) note that the qualitative method will answer complex questions 
about the nature of phenomena allowing the researcher to describe, explain and 
understand. 
Three research methods have triangulated the research. A clear description of the 
methodologies used and a rational for selecting the methodologies is provided. The 
chapter includes descriptions of the setting and populations as well as the number of 
subjects and participants used. The chapter includes a description of the data collection 
and analysis instruments and procedures used as well as a final summary of the 
methodologies. 
Research Co11text 
This section describes the place and situational factors that the study was 
embedded in. It describes the research framework or perspective. The study takes place 
within two contiguous Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) supervisory 
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districts surrounding a large northeastern city. There are currently 37 supervisory districts 
in the State of New York with a BOCES located in each. School districts residing within 
a supervisory district are considered component districts tied to the BOCES in that 
jurisdiction. A district superintendent leads each supervisory district and serves as chief 
executive officer of the supervisory disttict's BOCES. The BOCES District 
Superintendent reports to the State Commissioner of Education and a BOC ES Board of 
Education. The BOCES Board is comprised of one school board member from each 
component school district. 
Information and data has been collected and examined from 19 school districts 
and two BOCES located within each of the two BOCES supervisory districts. The data 
has been pulled together the following three ways: (a) survey, (b) interviews, and (c) 
focus group. The purpose of the study was to examine school district policy implications 
for long-tenn closure of schools due to pandemic influenza. For purposes of 
confidentiality, the two BOC ES and 19 associated school districts are not named. 
To help see the enonnity of the issue should a pandemic occur, demographic 
info1mation on the school districts and BOCES examined as part of this study are 
described in Appendix A. ln general, each BOCES involved in this study is a large and 
active educational enterprise. They are contiguous and SUITound a large northeastern city. 
The two BOCES districts encompass 19 suburban school districts. Within the study 
region there are approximately two hundred K-12 public schools serving over 100,000 
students. There are an additional 60 schools and near 35,000 students when the nearby 
city school population is included. Each of the nineteen school districts offers 
community schools that reflect each districts needs and values. 
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BOCES services are cooperatively shared between local school districts. BOCES 
supports the local school districts because working alone can be a drawback when a 
school district needs to: (a) update its instructional or administrative technology, (b) 
provide state-of-the-art job training, ( c) educate children with special needs, ( d) better 
manage administrative operations and facilities, or (e) provide comprehensive academic 
enrichment activities. In the mid l 980's BOCES began to offer component school 
districts environmental health and safety support, such as: staff training, chemical safety 
services, asbestos inspections, air quality testing, fire safety inspections, emergency 
planning, etc. By year 2000 most BOCES throughout the state were offering various 
levels of environmental health and safety services including school emergency planning 
and support. 
The researcher is employed by a BOCES described in this study. He directs the 
BOCES environmental health and safety service provided to many of the component 
school districts described in Appendix A. School pandemic preparedness as the research 
topic of this study is linked to BOCES through its environmental health and safety 
service. In May 2006 BOCES environmental health and safety office began to include 
pandemic response planning as a shared service. All county school districts could benefit 
through the coordinated efforts. At the same time, through BOCES health and safety 
service, a regional pandemic planning task force of volunteers was established to look at 
the pandemic planning issue. 
In May 2007 there was a fact-sharing meeting at the County Health Department 
with the County Health Director and a core of three school superintendents. The County 
health director and superintendents listened to presentations by three members of the 
30 
regional pandemic planning task force. The goal of the meeting was to seek local 
superintendents' support and guidance for the next phase of pandemic planning. The 
focus of the meeting was to look at school policy implications associated with long-term 
school closure due to a community disaster such as pandemic influenza. School leaders 
were asked to consider the need for policies on continuing education in the face of 
community disaster and improved communication between school districts. The ultimate 
hope of the task fo rce is to come up with a countywide school pandemic plan that could 
be used uniformly throughout the region. 
Over the last year area superintendents had opportunities to share their ideas with 
the core three superintendents. During that time, further planning by the regional task 
force proceeded and as a result a skeletal regional plan was developed and made 
available. Its purpose was to serve as an interim plan if superintendents fe lt they needed 
to have something in place. The plan is a template that allows the user to "fill in the 
blanks .. making the plan district specific. 
General Perspective 
The three research methods used here embody the following perspectives: (a) 
survey (b) interviews, and (c) focus group. The multi-method study demonstrates 
triangulation in the research. In triangulating the research methods the researcher has 
improved accuracy and precision of the research findings. 
The electronic survey data, a quantitative research method, has been analyzed 
using descriptive statistics, including means and percentages of response. The qualitative 
examination used analytical strategics to condense and summarize the interview and 
focus group data. The infonnation participants provided was examined, condensed and 
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summarized using analytic strategies described by Miles and Huberman (1994). Codes 
were affixed to a set of field notes drawn from observations and interviews. Sorting and 
sifting through information was completed to identify similar phrases, relationships 
between variables, patterns, themes, distinct differences between subgroups, and common 
sequences. Isolating the patterns and processes, commonalities and differences were 
identified and taken out to the field for each successive wave of data collection. 
Elaborations were made from small sets of generalizations that cover consistencies 
discerned in the database. Constructs and theories were developed, and are based on the 
generalizations made using a formalized body of knowledge. 
Survey . The first research method used was a surveying. The survey was 
administered to all members of the County Council of School Supe1intendents including 
nineteen (19) local school superintendents and two BOCES district superintendents. The 
surveys were administered before the interviews and focus group research. Surveys are 
sometimes referred to as questionnaires and used in evaluation to measure attitudes, 
opinions, behavior, or life circumstances (Fitzpatrick, Sanders, and Worthen, 2004). 
Bravennan ( 1996, p. 17)) notes that "surveys constitute one of the most important data 
collection tools available in evaJuation'·. The survey was administered electronically. 
Appendix C of the dissertation includes a copy of the survey instrument. 
The survey results provide a quantitative description of trends, attitudes, or 
opinions of School Superintendents throughout the County. The purpose of the survey 
and the rational for its selection was to generalize from the sample results so that 
inferences could be made about attitudes of this population. The advantage of the survey 
design was the economy of the design, convenience and the rapid turnaround in data 
collection. The survey was cross-sectional, with the data collected over a two week 
period. The self-administered questionnaire was an internet survey and administered 
online. The BOCES Technology Services Department provided the researcher with the 
online software (e.g., survey monkey) to administer and analyze the survey. 
The survey given was developed using a commercially available web-based 
electronic survey template provided by www.SurveyMonkey.com. Survey questions and 
statements were developed by the investigator, placed into the electronic survey format 
and designed to answer the research question. The survey included twenty four (24) 
separate statements that solicited responses from the superintendents. They responded by 
placing a check mark in the appropriate box and by typing short comments in the areas 
provided. 
To help interpret the data descriptive statistics including mean, and percentages 
were calculated by the researcher. The types of scales used to measure the items on the 
instrument included continuous scales, e.g., strongly agree to strongly disagree and 
categorical scales (e.g., yes/no). 
The survey was a nonrandom single-stage sampling procedure in which the 
researcher had access to the names of all County School Superintendents and was able to 
sample the entire population directly. The population has been selected based on their 
convenience and availability. In addition, the information collected was used to 
understand the attitudes and opinions of this specific population. The data has not been 
used to generalize school superintendent" s attitudes outside of the survey population. 
Face-to-face inten1iews. The second research method used included interviews. 
Three local school district superintendents were interviewed on the research topic. 
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Interviews were qualitative and used for learning the perspectives, behaviors, and 
experiences of others who have responsibilities and experience related to the research 
topic. Fitzpatrick, Sanders, and Worthen, (2004) imply that examining stories of others 
using the interview process the researcher can understand the various truths and 
perceptions that different groups and individuals bring to an experience. Appendix B 
includes the questions asked during the interviews. These same questions were asked of 
the focus group as well. The interviews were administered prior to the focus group 
research and after the school superintendent' s survey results were received. 
Focus group. The final research method incorporated a focus group. The focus 
group sample was "purposeful" . A focus group is an informal, small-group discussion 
designed to obtain in-depth qualitative infonnation (Dean, 2004). The participants arc 
part of a local pandemic planning task force. Participation in this task force is a 
commonality that each of the focus group participants has. The group is working together 
to address the research topic. The focus group involves a small, non-randomly selected 
sample. The focus group offers a way to explore the topic in depth with a small group of 
participants drawn from a narrowly defined population. 
The focus group research involved questioning the previously mentioned 
pandemic planning task force. Participants were encouraged to talk with each other about 
their experiences, preferences, needs, observations and perceptions. The conversation 
was lead by the researcher as moderator. The focus group research examined the group· s 
work over a one-year period. The overall goal of any focus group is to reveal the 
participant' s perceptions about the topics for discussion (Dean, 2004). The conversations 
were allowed to develop naturally to provide an opportunity for new dimensions or 
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insights to arise. The participants were encouraged to use their own words and will not be 
forced into selecting among predefined answers. This freedom provided an opportunity 
for the research to show not only what participants think about a topic but also how they 
approach it and why they arrive at the conclusions they hold as described by Dean 
(2004). The questions asked of the focus group resulted in a full range of participant 
responses to each question. The focus group discussions traded-off the generalizability 
of the structured survey for an in-depth, detailed, open-ended exploration of the issue. ln 
general, the group's work is being done to help prepare local school districts for an 
influenza pandemic and long-term school closure. Appendix D includes the moderator· s 
guiding questions asked of focus group members. This guide outlines the major topics 
that were covered. The focus group questioning opened with a general question that a11 
participants could answer and felt comfortable answering. The focus group technique 
places great emphasis on informal and freewheeling conversation (Dean, 2004). The 
discussion was audio taped. The participants were told at the beginning of the session 
that was being audio taped. The focus group research was administered after the school 
superintendent's survey results were received and shared with the focus group. The goal 
of the focus group was to learn what the participants th ink. Upon conclusion of the focus 
group the researcher transcribed the audio taped discussion. 
Research Participants 
Sun1ey. Research participants for the survey included the County Council of 
School Superintendents. The County Council of School Superintendents includes 19 
school superintendents and two BOCES district superintendents. They represent all of the 
public schools within the two BOCES supervisory districts described herein. They are a 
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subsidiary of the State Council of School Superintendents. The purpose of the County 
Council of School Superintendents is to provide leadership through a professional 
organization of school superintendents. The group fosters support and collegiality among 
its members. They promote the interest of education and children in the region and 
influence local, state, and national policy affecting education. 
Face-to-face interviews. The research participants for the second research method 
included three local school superintendents. They were interviewed about their attitudes, 
and experiences related to the research topic. The three school superintendents 
interviewed represented the County Council of School Superintendents. Each of the 
three superintendents expressed an interest in acting as liaisons between the regional 
pandemic task force (focus group) and the County Council of School Superintendents. 
See Appendix A - Districts 1, 9 and 18 for brief demographic information on the districts 
represented by the three superintendents interviewed. The interviews were face-to-face: 
one on one, in person interviews. The advantage of this type of research method is that 
the participants provided historical information and it has allowed the researcher control 
over the line of questioning (Creswell, 2003). The researcher conducted an unstructured, 
open-ended interview and audio taped the interviews. Interviews were transcribed soon 
after each interview. 
Focus group. Research participants in the focus group included individuals who 
participate in the regional school pandemic planning task force. The focus group research 
examined the perceptions of the group regarding their work over the last year, as well as 
their thoughts on the superintendent survey and interview results. The focus group 
included five individuals encompassing the fields of education and health. The group 
36 
included: a school physician, assistant principal, administrator, local fire chief, school 
nurse and faci lities operations supervisor. The researcher is a participant within the 
group. Each group member is employed by local school districts or BOCES. As part of 
their work related duties each member has school emergency planning responsibilities as 
well. Membership in the group is voluntary. The group's charge is to work together on 
behalf of all schools throughout the county to develop a coordination and education plan 
aimed at reducing the impact of an influenza pandemic. 
Over the last year the task force has developed, for local school districts, a 
common template-type pandemic plan. The common school pandemic plan has some 
leeway for individualization for each school district, but also has a global approach to the 
general problem so that the larger community is working together toward a common goal. 
The focus group was chosen for the study because their work involves the research topic 
and their efforts have provided insight into the research question. 
Procedures for Data Collection 
As mentioned in the methods sections above several data collection techniques, 
instruments and recording processes have been used. The first instrument to collect data 
was a survey. A survey was used to identify local school leader's perceptions of the 
problem. The survey was appropriate for answering the research question at hand. 
Research participants surveyed included all members of the County Council of School 
Superintendents. The survey group included 19 school superintendents and two BOCES 
district supe1intendents. The survey was administered electronically. Respondents 
completed and returned the survey via the internet. A copy of the survey is attached as 
appendix B. 
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Prior to administering the survey it was piloted by five people who have formerly 
served as school superintendents or who are currently serving as school superintendents 
outside of the county used for the study. The pilot testing was impo11ant to establish the 
content validity of the survey instrument and to improve questions, format, and the 
scales. The pilot survey respondents were asked to provide feedback regarding survey 
design, clarity, and usefulness. The final survey was administered after pilot test data was 
incorporated into the survey instrument. 
The second instrument used in data collection included interviews. The 
interviews were conducted after the survey and before the focus group research. The 
questions asked during the interviews were also used during the focus group. A copy of 
the interview questions is attached as appendix C. The research participants for the 
interviews included three local school superintendents. Interviews elicited reports of 
information about the research participants regarding their life conditions, beliefs or 
attitudes. Questions eliciting the research participant's reports were asked orally. 
The final research instrument included a focus group. lt examined the yearlong 
efforts of a regional task force. The focus group research commenced after the results of 
the initial survey are received and interviews completed. The data obtained from the 
survey and interviews was shared with the focus group and then they were questioned on 
their perceptions and attitudes regarding the issue at hand. A copy of the focus group 
questions is attached as appendix D. 
Data Collection and Analvsis 
Analyzing the data resultant from the research involved describing the meaning 
derived or attributed to the infonnation collected. The meanings have taken the forms of 
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answers found for the research question. Data analysis helped to understand the research 
paiticipanf s perceptions, attitudes, behaviors and experiences related to the research 
topic and question. 
The survey data analysis includes infom1ation about the number of members of 
the sample who did not complete every item in the survey. Numbers and percentages 
describing respondents and non-respondents have been used to present this information. 
A descriptive analysis has been done that indicates the means, percentages and range of 
scores for these variables. The researcher tabulated numerous responses to each survey 
question. The results are expressed in percentages of the respondents agreeing or 
disagreeing. 
Another type of analyses used for the study included comparing and contrasting. 
According to Thomas and Brubaker (2000, p 225) "comparing involves identifying 
simila1ities among phenomena, while contrasting consists of recognizing differences 
among them.'· The data collected from each of the three research methods were 
compared for similarities and differences in the participants' attitudes and perceptions. 
In analyzing the data the researcher organized and prepared the data for analysis. 
This included typing up field notes, transcriptions and sorting and arranging the data into 
different types depending on the sources of information. The researcher read through all 
the data, as a first basic step to obtain a general sense of the information and to reflect on 
its overall meaning. At that time, the researcher detem1ined: (a) the general ideas 
participants are saying, (b) the tone of the ideas, and (c) the general impression of the 
overall depth. credibility, and use of the information. The researcher then began detailed 
analysis with a coding process. According to Creswell (2003) coding is the process of 
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organizing the material into "chunks". It involved taking text data into catego1ies and 
labeling those categories with a tenn, based on actual language of the participant. 
Creswell calls this an in vivo term. The codes included setting and context codes, 
perspectives held by participants, and the subject's ways of thinking about the research 
problem. Based on the analysis of data the researcher interpreted it. The analyses focused 
on perceptions of school leaders and health professionals regarding school policy 
implications associated with long-term school closure due to pandemic influenza. 
Confidentiality 
The results of the research are reported out in the aggregate. Individual names of 
school districts, BOCES and persons participating in the survey, interview and focus 
group are not reported. Individual comments are not reported by name. Individuals and 
organizations participating in the research are not named and their identity has been kept 
confidential. The St. John Fisher College Institutional Review Board (fRB) has approved 
the study. Participants are not mentioned by name or by school district name in any of the 
research results or reports. Every effort will be made to select narrative quotes to 
illustrate the concepts analyzed in the research in a manner that protects the anonymity of 
all subjects. Subjects are linked to the data by an identifying code known only to the 
researcher. All data including research field notes, transcription records, audiotapes, 
subject codes, and survey results will be kept in a file in the researcher's home office. 
Due to the small numbers of school superintendents in the area of the study it is 
possible that an immediate peer of a subject who reads the research report might identify 
a subject as a participant of the study. However, steps have been taken to reduce this risk. 
No subject is mentioned by name, position or school district they represent in any of the 
40 
research results or reports. In addition, every effort has been made to select narrative 
quotes to illustrate the concepts analyzed in the research in a manner that protects the 
anonymity of all subjects. If a subject has identified politically sensitive issues or 
sensitive personal matters, no information related to these is used in narrative quotes or 
related to a subject by name, position or school district anywhere in the research results 
or reports. 
Summcuy of the Methodologies 
The research has involved a multi-method study including three research 
methods. T1iangulation of the different sources of information has been made by 
examining evidence from the sources and using it to build a coherent justification for 
themes. The first research methodology implemented was a survey. It was administered 
to the County Council of School Superintendents. The survey was used to understand 
different school leader philosophies regarding long-term school closure and its impact on 
school policy. 
The second research method included interviews with three local school 
superintendents. Interviews served the purpose of enabling research participants to report 
information about themselves, such as their life condition, beliefs or attitudes. The 
interviews were completed after the survey data had been collected and analyzed. 
The final method used to collect data involved a focus group in which the 
researcher served as a participant observer and facilitator for the group. The group 
involved the regional school pandemic task force. The group's activities over a one-year 
period were questioned in detail. Survey data and interview data was used to solicit 
discussion from the focus group. The same questions used for the interviews were used 
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for the focus group. The researcher participated with the group as an observer who is 
studying the group process and was welcomed to make comments. Information obtained 
from the survey, interviews and focus group will be used to assist the school pandemic 
task force devise an action plan for the coming year. 
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Chapter IV: Research Results 
Research Question 
This study examined the K-12 public school policy issues related to extended 
school closures due to pandemic influenza. The results of the study are presented in this 
section, and organized chronologically in terms of how the data were collected. Three 
research methods were used to answer the research question: What are the perceptions of 
school superintendents and a community task force regarding the health, pedagogical, 
social, and economic planning and policy decisions for long-term school closure due to 
pandemic influenza? The research methods used for this study included: (a) electronic 
survey, (b) face-to-face interviews, and (c) focus group. 
Electronic Survey Results 
Perceptions of twenty-one (2 1) local school superintendents (participants), 
representing an entire county in upstate New York, were sought through an electronic 
survey. The superintendents were asked to provide their insight regarding various 
community health, pedagogical, social and economic policy implications associated with 
long-tenn closure of K-12 school districts. Twenty-one (21 ) of the twenty-one (21) 
survey participants started the survey; however, only sixteen (16) participants completed 
the survey, a 76.2% completion rate. Some of the participants did not respond to every 
statement, and therefore, a reduction in the total completion rate was observed. 
Although the majority of respondents completed the survey, two superintendents 
commented that they had technical difficulties, stating they had trouble seeing whether 
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the circle preceded or followed the intended response on some items. Other respondents 
seemed opposed to the topic, and this appeared to affect their motivation to complete 
some items. Their comments suggested that preparing for extended school closure due to 
pandemic influenza was not a priority. One respondent mentioned that there was a great 
deal of media "hype" about an imminent pandemic 18 months ago and wondered if it is a 
real or perceived danger. Another respondent also objected stating, ''Often, when a social 
issue is raised, schools become the primary audience to address the problem". They 
indicated that addressing the issue takes them away from their primary role, which is 
student learning and success. One superintendent mentioned that, "these are issues that I 
have not thought a great deal about until recently'', suggesting that he might have left 
some items blank because he had not yet formed an opinion. 
Demographic data. The first part of the survey requested demographic 
infonnation regarding the survey participants. Table 3 shows their demographic 
characteristics. 
Table 3 shows that the majority of respondents were Caucasian males with a 
mean age of 54 years. Most respondents have over five years of experience as school 
superintendents. Two respondents skipped the question on ethnicity, and one participant 
skipped the question regarding gender. Four respondents skipped the question on age, 
and one skipped the question on years of experience. 
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Table 3 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants (N = 21) 
Characteristic !1 % 
Ethnicity 
Caucasian 18 95 
African American 5 
Gender 
Male 14 70 
Female 6 30 
Age at the time of survey (years) 
40-44 2 10.5 
45-49 2 10.5 
50-54 4 21 
55-60 10 53 
Over 60 5 
Years of experience as a superintendent 
<1 2 10 
l-4 4 20 
4-6 8 40 
8-10 2 10 
> 10 4 20 
Table 4 shows the student populations for the districts represented in the survey. 
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Table 4 
Student Populations per School District (N=21) 
Student population 
<1000-3000 
3000-6000 
9000 - 12,000 
!! 
5 
11 
2 
Note: Three respondents skipped the question regarding their district's student 
population. 
% 
28 
61 
11 
Probability a pandemic will occur. The next part of the survey attempted to 
understand the superintendents' perceptions on the likelihood that a future pandemic 
event, in their county, requiring long-te1m school closure, will occur. Table 5 below 
illustrates what school superintendents think about the likelihood that an influenza 
pandemic will occur within one, five, and ten years. 
Table 5 data show that 58% of the superintendents responding do not believe that 
an influenza pandemic will occur and cause extended school closure countywide within 
the next ten years. This issue would appear to be perceived as a low threat and therefore a 
low priority for most respondents. 
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Table 5 
Responses Lo Survey Questions Regarding Participants' Beliefs Whether or not an 
Influenza Pandemic Will Occur and Cause Extended School Closure Within One, Five 
and Ten Years 
Survey Statement and Response !! % 
An influenza pandemic will occur and cause extended school 
closure within one year 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Agree 2 11 
Disagree 11 61 
Strongly Disagree 5 28 
An influenza pandemic will occur and cause extended school 
closure within five years 
Strongly Agree 5 
Agree 4 22 
Disagree 10 56 
Strongly Disagree 3 17 
An influenza pandemic will occur and cause extended school 
closure within ten years 
Strongly Agree 2 10 
Agree 6 32 
Disagree 10 53 
Strongly Disagree 5 
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Policy issues. The primary research question focuses on school policy issues 
associated with extended school closure due to pandemic influenza. To assist in 
answering the question, superintendents were asked to comment on whether or not they 
believe that a school board policy related to long-term closure is necessary. Table 6 
illustrates the superintendents' thoughts regarding the need for a school board policy. 
Table 6 
Responses to Survey Question, "Is A School Board Policy On Extended School Closures 
Due To Pandemic Influenza Needed?" 
Response 
Yes, a policy is needed 
No, a policy is not needed 
9 
8 
% 
53 
47 
Note: N = 21. Four superintendents did not answer the question regarding policy. 
Approximately half of the respondents do not think a board policy is needed while 
the other half of them do. Those supetintendents who wanted a policy indicated that a 
Board policy would provide direction to those within the district, and regulations would 
then need to be developed to address its implementation. They mentioned a policy is 
needed to clarify expectations, duties, and responsibilities of staff, students and the 
community. 
Those superintendents who said a policy was not needed mentioned that a set of 
procedures for responding to the situation should be developed; however, board approved 
policy regarding a situation whose conditions are yet to be defined may be more 
constraining than helpful. Respondents stated that: "a board policy is not necessary 
because the county health department will provide direction" and "a comprehensive 
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emergency plan inclusive of procedures for a school closure relative to a pandemic 
should be in place and it really would not be a policy issue." 
As stated in Chapter 1, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have developed a checklist (2006) 
to assist LEAs in developing and improving plans to prepare for and respond to an 
influenza pandemic. The checklist recommends a number of strategies school districts 
should consider when preparing to respond to a pandemic event. The survey addressed 
some of those recommendations by getting superintendents to comment on their opinions 
and perceptions of the CDC and HHS guidelines. One of the survey items suggests that 
the prevention of the spread of disease will be aided by school districts having policies 
that discourage employees and students from going to work/school when they are ill. 
Superintendents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with this recommendation. Table 
7 shows their responses. 
Of those superintendents who provided responses, most thought that creating a 
policy needs to be a judgment determination by each individual district's superintendent 
and school board. They also mentioned that schools should discourage people from 
going to work when they are ill by communicating regularly to parents, students, and 
staff. Many respondents agreed that the term "ill" must be defined or "people will be out 
for anything." Overall, most superintendents agreed that there does not need to be a 
policy for this. One respondent said: "Schools should discourage people from going to 
work or school when they are ill, but I do not think that we need a board policy on this.'· 
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Table 7 
Responses to Survey Question "ls A School Board Policy On Discouraging Employees 
And Students From Going To Work/School When They Are Ill Needed?" 
Response 
Yes, a policy is needed 
No, a policy is not needed 
!1 
6 
10 
Note: N = 21. Five superintendents did not respond to the question. 
% 
37.5 
62.5 
Responsibility for feeding students. The CDC checklist also recommends that 
schools develop plans for feeding students receiving free and reduced-priced meals when 
schools close for extended periods. When asked whether or not school superintendents 
agreed with this recommendation, virtually all, 100%. of the respondents indicated that 
they disagreed or strongly disagreed that they have responsibility for feeding students 
when schools are closed for long periods. Two superintendents added comments 
regarding this item. One indicated that, "if we are closed then we are closed", and the 
other said, "In an emergency, state, governmental, and community entities share this 
responsibility." These comments suggest that some superintendents see their districts' 
response as a part of a larger response supervised by another agency and informed by a 
larger, more encompassing county, state or federal effort. 
Annual training. Another CDC recommendation is that at least once a year, 
students, faculty and staff be educated on how and why it is important to improve 
personal hygiene (e.g., training in use of non-medical ways to reduce the spread of 
influenza, such as covering coughs and sneezes, washing hands, and staying home if you 
are sick). Table 8 shows how superintendents thought regarding this training 
recommendation. 
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Table 8 
At Least Once A Year, Students Faculty And Staff Shall Be Educated On Non-Medical 
Ways To Reduce The Spread Of Influenza 
Agree 
Disagree 
Response !! 
IO 
6 
Note: N = 21 . Five superintendents did not respond to the question. 
% 
62 
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Those who felt annual training for students was needed suggested that it could be 
accomplished through health education programs and embedded into the current school 
curriculum. They suggested that staff training could be done during the annual Right-to-
Know training on infectious diseases that staff receives every year. One superintendent 
who did not believe training should be mandatory suggested that this is a public health 
concern, not necessarily a K-12 issue. 
Alternative learning options. Superintendents were asked: If schools are closed 
for long periods should schools have alternative learning options available for students? 
Table 9 shows their responses. 
Table 9 
Alternative Learning Options Are Needed When Schools Close For Extended Periods 
Agree 
Disagree 
Response !! 
12 
3 
Note: N = 21 , Six superintendents did not respond to the question. 
% 
80 
20 
Of those who responded, all mentioned that alternative learning might be 
accomplished by using web-based instruction such as online programs, distance learning, 
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teacher websites, and volunteer community online tutoring. Others offered: self-guided 
instruction using appropriate resources (e.g., textbooks, mailing home assignments, 
phone conferencing, television programming, book mobiles, and tutoring centers). One 
superintendent said that he would rely on "State Education Department (SED) options." 
This Superintendent would appear to be depending on SED to provide instructional 
options, possibly through their website. 
Communication methods. Superintendents were asked what communication 
methods their district might use to maintain contact with employees and students during 
long-term closure. Table l 0 lists their responses. 
Table I 0 
Communication Methods That Schools May Use During Extended School Closure 
Superintendents' Responses 
Internet, and web-based sources 
Mass notification via telephone and 
automated phone messages 
Email, 
Public television 
U.S. mail 
Connect Ed calling system 
News media 
Local cable television 
Number of Responses 
7 
5 
5 
2 
2 
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Table 10 is a compilation of methods that superintendents said they would use to 
communicate with students, parents, and staff during extended school closures. The 
survey question was open-ended, and each superintendent had his or her own list of 
communication methods that they would use. 
Paying staff Superintendents were asked if all staff should be paid their full 
salary while schools are closed long-term. Table 11 shows the superintendents' 
responses. 
Table 11 
Staff Should Be Paid During Extended School Closure 
Agree 
Disagree 
Response 
10 
5 
Note: N = 21, Six superintendents did not respond to the question. 
% 
67 
33 
Most superintendents agree staff should be paid, provided all aid sources continue 
and the staff participates in supporting home schooling. Some suggested that staff should 
be paid, only if the government does not penalize districts if they are closed and therefore 
do not meet aidable days. One superintendent thought that schools would have to make 
up the time by canceling breaks including summer, if necessary. 
Critical functions needed to continue operations. Superintendents were asked 
what critical functions must continue while schools are closed for long periods. Table 12 
below shows their responses. They were allowed to select more than one option, and 
therefore, the total number of responses exceeds 100%. 
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Table 12 
Critical Functions Needed to Continue (n = 21) 
Characteristic 
School Facilities (phones, boilers, energy management, etc.) 
Payroll services 
Business services 
Computer services/email 
Communications I public relations 
School Administration 
Custodial services 
Mail services 
Alternative instruction 
Security 
Note: Five respondents skipped the question. 
% 
15 94 
15 94 
14 88 
14 88 
14 88 
13 81 
11 69 
11 69 
10 63 
6 
Superintendents were asked how the critical functions listed above might continue 
during school closure. In other words, they were asked, what is needed to be in place to 
keep these functions active during a school closure? Of those who provided responses, 
the majority believed that the emergency plan for covering key positions, such as 
facilities operations, communications, and web sources would need to be maintained. 
Most superintendents agreed that a limited number of staff will need to continue to work, 
if able, either on-site or from home. They thought that school offices would need to 
remain open, at least skeletally, even when kids cannot be in school. 
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School employees expected to report to work. Table 13 below shows the school 
employees who superintendents felt should be expected to report to work when schools 
are closed for long periods. They were allowed to select more than one option, and 
therefore, the total number of responses exceeds 100%. 
Table 13 
School Employees Expected to Report to Work (N=2 l) 
Response !l % 
Facilities Staff 13 81 
School Superintendent 12 75 
Piincipals 11 69 
Payroll staff 11 69 
Administrators 9 56 
BOCES Superintendent 8 50 
Transportation staff " .) 18 
None 6 
Note: Five respondents skipped the question. 
Superintendents felt that certain individuals should report to work if able. Of 
those who responded most thought facilities staff should report to work to keep the 
school buildings operational. They also thought it would be important for the school 
superintendent to report to work. Many believe other business services staff and 
personnel office staff should be expected to report to work so that payroll services could 
continue. One suggested that security staff should report to work, too. Some thought that 
all who are not '·it)" should report to work. 
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School employees expected to workfrom home. Superintendents were asked if 
they believe employees should work from home when schools are closed for long 
periods. Table 14 shows their responses. 
Table 14 
Employees Should Be Expected to Work from Home 
Agree 
Disagree 
Response n 
13 
2 
Note: N = 21 , Six superintendents did not respond to the question. 
% 
87 
13 
Many superintendents felt that administrators and teaching staff should be 
expected to work from home and be responsible for professional responsibilities, e.g., 
supporting alternative learning methods and preparing lesson plans. Most thought that, if 
employees are paid, they should work from home, if able. 
Authority to close all county schools. Superintendents were asked who has the 
authority to close all county schools in the event of an influenza pandemic. Table 15 
below shows the superintendents' responses. They were allowed to select more than one 
option, and therefore, the total number of responses exceeds 100%. 
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Table 15 
Individuals Who Have The Authority To Close All County Schools (n=21) 
Response !! % 
Governor 11 69 
Commissioner of Education 10 63 
County Health Director 10 63 
BOCES Superintendent 4 25 
School Superintendent 3 19 
County Executive 6 
Note: N = 21, Five respondents skipped the question. 
Many superintendents were unsure who has the authority to close all county 
schools. One superintendent stated, " It is an interesting question that needs to be 
researched for unintended consequences of the action." This appears to have meant that 
by closing schools for extended periods many problems could arise (e.g., loss of 
instruction time, loss of state aid, or the issue of paying staff while schools are closed). 
They also thought that the county health director could close schools only for medical 
reasons. 
Interagency collaboration. The superintendents were asked if they agree or 
disagree with the statement: "Interagency collaboration to ensure unified responses 
between school districts, BOCES', county health department and other agencies will be 
necessary before, during, and after a pandemic." Table 16 shows superintendents' 
opinions regarding the need for interagency collaboration. 
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Table 16 
Interagency Collaboration Is Necessary 
Agree 
Disagree 
Response 
15 
Note: N = 21 , Five superintendents did not respond to the question. 
% 
93 
6 
The large majority of superintendents believe interagency collaboration is 
necessary. However, one superintendent strongly disagreed with the statement. This may 
have been an error in the marking of the survey response. The superintendents who 
responded and agreed that interagency collaboration was important were asked to briefly 
describe how it might be accomplished. One mentioned that he did not know how it 
might be accomplished. Others suggested that regional planning is imperative, and a 
coordinated approach between the county and BOCES will be needed for a start. They 
suggested a task force should be established, and include representatives from these core 
groups so that collaboration is ensured and communication is coordinated across entities. 
In terms of more formal coJJaboration, superintendents were asked if BOCES 
should coordinate a countywide task force comprised of representatives from county 
school districts and other stakeholders to address the issue of pandemic planning and 
extended school closure. Table 17 shows their responses. 
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Table 17 
Responses to Survey Question, "Should BOCES Coordinate A Pandemic Planning Task 
Force?" (N = 21) 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
Response !! 
7 
5 
4 
Note: N = 21 , Five superintendents did not respond to the question. 
% 
44 
31 
25 
There was almost an equal division on the superintendents' thoughts regarding 
whether or not BOCES should coordinate a countywide task force. Those who did not 
think BOCES should coordinate a countywide task force suggested that the county health 
department or emergency management office is a better choice over BOCES. One 
Superintendent said: "These agencies already have a team that has worked on this, so 
why duplicate efforts?" Of those superintendents that thought BOCES should coordinate 
a task force, some believe that "BOCES is the best place for this coordination to occur 
because it enables all school districts to help each other while providing a coordinated 
approach.'' 
lnten•iew Results 
The purpose of the face-to-face interviews was to examine school policy issues 
associated with long-term school closure due to an influenza pandemic event. Together 
with the electronic survey results and focus group data, the interview results have been 
used to estimate the influence that extended school closures may exert on school districts 
throughout the county assuming an influenza pandemic will occur in the days or years 
59 
ahead. The analyses of the interviews included constant comparison and axial coding as 
described by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Perceptions of three (3) local school superintendents (participants), each 
representing his or her school district, within the same county used for the survey, were 
sought. These individuals were chosen to be interviewed because they volunteered in a 
meeting to represent their peers who make up the County Council of School 
Superintendents. The three superintendents were interviewed separately in the spring of 
2008. 
The three superintendents were asked a series of the same eight questions, and to 
provide their insight regarding the survey results. The researcher who, during the 
interviews, referenced the results of the survey prepared the questions. The interview 
questions can be found as Appendix C of this report. The interviews were tape recorded 
and transcribed. The perceptions of the interviewed superintendents were sought 
regarding the variance of responses and meaning of the survey data. The face-to-face 
interview questioning began by describing the purpose of the interview, which was to 
have them help interpret the results of the survey. 
Demographic data. Each of the three superintendents interviewed represented 
suburban school distiicts in upstate New York. The student enrollments for their districts 
ranged between I, I 00 - 3, 700. The annual budgets for the districts ranged from about 
$1 7 ,000,000 to $54,000,000. 
Probability a pandemic will occur. The interviews began by asking interviewees 
why they believe the majority of local school superintendents do not think a pandemic 
will occur that causes long-term school closure within the next 10 years. Three different 
60 
opinions were expressed. The first superintendent mentioned that a pandemic of this 
nature has not happened in their lifetime; therefore, what would cause them to think that 
it is likely to happen. He suggested that if they have never experienced it, then they 
probably cannot relate to it. The second superintendent said that superintendents may not 
be completely infonned about this topic and they often delegate this work to 
subordinates. Therefore, they generally are not part of the discussions regarding this 
topic. The third superintendent mentioned, "There was a lot of hype, a lot of media 
attention; however it has waned over the last year or so." He continued by saying: "This 
year's flu season was uneventful, and I think it is human nature that people begin to put 
certain things aside and, unless it is immediate, you tend not to prioritize it until it is 
necessary." This superintendent thinks it will happen sooner rather than later. All of the 
superintendents felt that there is probably a certain degree of cynicism that 
superintendents develop about the likelihood of anything happening that has not already 
happened in their experience. 
Policy issues. The interviewees were asked why approximately half of the 
superintendents surveyed think that a board policy on extended closure due to pandemic 
influenza is needed and the other half did not. All three interviewees felt that a policy on 
this issue should be in place. However, they all agreed that those superintendents who do 
not believe it is going to happen, also do not believe there should be a policy. 
Superintendents do not want to put a policy in place for something that they do not 
believe will even occur. 
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The first interviewee said: 
The discrepancy is based on how much thought and exposure the superintendent 
may have had to these potential issues. Some purists say this is a management 
issue so there should be a plan, but not necessarily a policy. I advise that a model 
policy be developed so that people could refer to it and use as a starting point for 
discussion with their boards about what will we do if we need to close school for 
extended periods. You are never going to get unanimity of opinion among 
supe1intendents. 
The second interviewee agreed: "For those who do not want a policy, having the 
definitive steps to follow, procedures to be addressed in a pandemic flu situation, would 
be very helpful for everyone to have". Based on the interviewees· responses, the 
difference of opinion regarding the need for board policy seems to be based on each 
school superintendent's and school board·s philosophy regarding policy. 
Responsibility.for feeding students. The next interview question refened to 
current CDC guidelines that suggest schools should incorporate into their pandemic 
influenza plans a process to address students who receive free and reduced priced meals 
at school. One hundred percent (100%) of the respondents disagreed that schools have a 
responsibility to feed students who rely on free and reduced lunch while schools are 
closed for extended periods. The interviewees thought school superintendents did not 
believe they have a responsibility to continue providing subsidized meals to students 
during an extended school closure because there is a presumption that their custodial duty 
to children ends with the timeframe in which school is conducted. They do not provide 
free lunch to students dming April break or summer vacation. why would there be a 
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presumption that they should provide food during an extended epidemic type of 
situation? Most school districts do not have the capacity to transport food that could be 
like "Meals-on-Wheels·· and still be quality meals by the time they got to the students in 
need. All of the interviewees agreed that if schools are closed as a site, no one should be 
there and they do not want people congregating, increasing the potential of spreading 
disease. In addition, they agreed that logistically and financially schools are not set up to 
provide this service when schools are closed. 
Annual training. The next interview question referenced that 63% of the 
superintendents surveyed agree, that at least once a year, students, faculty, and staff 
should receive training on the use of non-medical ways to reduce the spread of influenza, 
such as covering coughs and sneezes, washing hands and staying home if you are sick. 
Approximately 40% of the superintendents surveyed did not believe this training is 
necessary. All of the interviewees felt that some sort of training be done. Although the 
first supe1intendent disagreed that annual training should be required, he said : 
Incorporating this kind of training into health instruction makes perfect sense. 
Incorporating it into the annual Right to Know training and basic health related 
issues that we do with our staff annually makes sense, but if somebody asked me 
to sign a piece paper to guarantee that every person that enters these school 
buildings will have this instruction at least annually, I v..1ould have a hard time 
sweating to that. 
The second superintendent said: 
I can only guess why some may be averse to the training. I believe the training is 
necessary, and it should be included in the annual mandatory training that we do 
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for the many other mandates that we have. The only assumption I could make in 
terms of the minority of superintendents who don't believe its necessary is that 
maybe they are averse to the whole notion of yet another mandate, another 
requirement. Providing some examples of how this could be done in entertaining 
in brief way, e.g., a packaged presentation that is not lengthy, that could be rolled 
out at staff meetings, and is user friendly would probably be a palatable way to 
provide the training. 
The third superintendent said: "The superintendents, who think that training 
should not occur, likely do not believe it needs to be an added requirement. lt is already 
built right into the curriculum. There is not one year that goes by that the message doesn' t 
go our.·· 
Overall, the interviewees thought that providing education and infom1ation to 
students and staff on the use of non-medical ways to reduce the spread of influenza was a 
good idea. However, making it a mandated annual requirement was probably not a good 
idea, because they could not guarantee that everyone in the district could receive such 
training. Furnishing the infonnation to students through health education classes, and to 
staff through the annual Right-to-Know training, appear to be feasible ways to make the 
infomrntion available. 
lnteragency collaboration. The interviewees were asked about the survey result 
that indicated: (a) 43% of superintendents believe BOCES should coordinate a 
countywide task force to address pandemic planning, while 38% do not, and (b) 25% of 
superintendents are not sure whether or not BOC ES should coordinate such a task force. 
All three interviewees agreed that there definitely is a role for BOCES in this. BOCES 
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represents the educational aspect of pandemic planning on which a county would not 
necessarily be focused. They all felt that the charge to the task force should be really to 
help develop a model plan and policy. By having a school board policy as a template 
school districts can decide to use it or not. At least there is something available to 
consider. They all agreed that BOCES should reach out to the county for collaborative 
planning and one of the first things to sort out is, what the county already has in place and 
what assistance do they need from the schools, so that schools are not replicating efforts. 
They felt that information on what is being done should be communicated through the 
BOCES Superintendent and then he or she could update the school superintendents as 
necessary at monthly superintendent meetings. 
The interviewees were told that 94% of survey respondents believed that 
interagency collaboration to ensure responses between school districts, BOCES, county 
health department and other agencies will be necessary before, during and after a 
pandemic. The interviewees were asked what methods they believe should be used to 
notify school superintendents of pandemic planning efforts conducted by outside 
agencies, e.g., county health department and county emergency management office. The 
first superintendent mentioned "it is not effective to hear something from three different 
agencies unless hearing it at the same time in a coordinated fashion. A way to do that 
might be to produce a DV D or a PowerPoint presentation including, prerecorded pieces 
from outside agencies as a part of it. Everybody gets that consistent message and then 
maybe there is an opportunity for questions and answers.'' 
The interviewees all agreed that information should be provided to the BOCES 
District Superintendent and he or she can bring it to school superintendents at their 
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monthly meetings. The BOCES district superintendent should get information regarding 
interagency collaborative effo11s from a task force or other means. 
Current status of school districts· preparedness. The interviewees were asked if a 
flu pandemic were to happen tomorrow in our county what procedures would be in place 
for schools, and what procedures are still needed? The interviewees all felt that most of 
the schools would look to the BOCES superintendent for direction about a response. 
BOCES would be expected to have a distinct role in coordinating response effo11s. The 
first superintendent mentioned that: "Probably the smartest thing would be to make sure 
that the county health commissioner, county emergency manager, and the two BOC ES 
district superintendents for the County have the same infonnation and are acting in a 
coordinated fashion in advising the schools what to do.'' The second superintendent 
mentioned, "I don't know the status in the school districts throughout the County, but my 
guess is that very few have any procedures outlined yet.'' The third superintendent said: 
·'Probably about 50% would use their own calling systems that provide messages and 
ongoing messages to them. On a regular basis parents would be getting updates and 
information on where we are, from a personalized point of view." The majority of school 
superintendents would tum to the media and districts would use television or radio to 
communicate. The interviewees all mentioned that most districts have general procedures 
for some sort of an emergency situation and have a format to communicate to their 
parents in some way (e.g., whether school is open or not). The one issue that they all had 
a concern about was that districts have not clarified the particular issue regarding ongoing 
instruction, and what implication that would have for contractual obligations if school is 
closed for a prolonged period of time. 
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Other comments. At the conclusion of the interviews, participants were asked if 
there is anything else they would like to say about the implications regarding long-term 
school closure or pandemic planning. One interviewee said: 'Td just reinforce the fact 
that it is important for somebody, I think perhaps other than the school superintendents 
themselves, to be thinking about this and to be making plans." Another interviewee 
mentioned that: 
It would be interesting for us as a region to explore online use of web-based 
Blackboard technology. I am surprised that coming from other segments of New 
York State that we do not have more active use of Blackboard technology, and an 
implication would be, this is a perfect opportunity for us to begin to fully exploit 
some instructional technology that we haven't used in the past that could be 
valuable in the case of a pandemic school closure. This is just one other reason to 
consider a motivation to use that technology. 
Interviews summary. In general, the interviewees' responses concur with the 
survey results. However, more strongly than the survey respondents, they stated that a 
board policy on extended school closures should be developed. They also believe that 
BOCES should take a more active role in coordinating a pandemic preparedness task 
force than do the survey respondents. They agree that interagency collaboration is an 
important aspect of pandemic preparedness. In addition, the interviewees believe more 
work is needed to identify and develop methods to educate students during extended 
school closures. 111ey suggest that the focus of this educational process should be linked 
to technology, such as web-based learning and the use of '·black-board·' technology. 
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Focus Group Results 
The third analytical method used to examine school policy implications associated 
with long-tem1 school closure due to a pandemic influenza outbreak was a focus group. A 
task force of ten people working on pandemic planning for local school districts was 
asked to participate in the focus group. The focus group began with a review of the 
survey data and interview results. The group was asked to comment on their perceptions 
of the results and data presented. They were asked what they believed the next charge of 
the task force should be for the up-coming year. 
Members of the task force are employed by, or represent, various local school 
districts throughout the county. Each participant of the focus group worked for, or 
represented, the local suburban school districts. Of the ten individuals invited to the 
focus group, six pa1ticipated. Those six included a school physician, a school nurse, an 
assistant p1incipal, a local fire chief who works as a district-level custodial supervisor, a 
districl level administrator, and a business official. Those on the task force who were 
invited, but did not participate included: an assistant superintendent for business, a 
district level administrator, a facilities director, and a school principal. The focus group 
discussion was tape recorded and transctibed. The analyses used for the focus group data 
included comparing and contrasting. According to Thomas and Brubaker (2000, p 225) 
"comparing involves identifying similarities among phenomena, while contrasting 
consists of recognizing differences among them." The data collected was compared for 
similarities and differences in the participants' attitudes and perceptions. 
The group discussed the K-12 school policy issues related to extended school 
closures due to pandemic influenza. The researcher who is also a member of the task 
68 
force facilitated the focus group. The questions asked of the focus group can be found in 
Appendix D. 
Probability a pandemic will occur. The first question to the group was: \Vhy do 
you believe that the majority oflocal school superintendents do not believe a pandemic 
will occur that causes long-term school closure within the next 10 years? Focus group 
respondents reacted to the superintendents' lack of concern in several ways. One person 
felt that it was dismissed because of the media. He said: "There was a lot of media hype 
when they started talking about it and then it kind of faded out, there hasn·t been much in 
the news, there hasn't been much going on and let's face it superintendents are busy." 
The group questioned whether or not the survey should have focused only on extended 
school closure due to pandemics. They wondered if the issue would be more impo1iant to 
superintendents if all disasters that could cause extended closure were considered. The 
school nurse stated that: " l wonder if, the way the question is worded, it says an influenza 
pandemic, they may have been thinking of only influenza and that is why more of them 
do not think its going to happen. There are many events that could cause long-tenn 
closure. I would hope that many of them are not in denial regarding this potential 
problem, but you never know." Another acknowledged how busy superintendents are by 
saying: .. Stuff like this gets put on the back burner, yeah it is impo1iant, yeah \Ve should 
do it, you know, next week, but it just doesn't happen." 
Policy issues. The next question to the group addressed the need for board policy 
on extended school closure due to pandemic influenza. The group was asked: Why do 
you believe half of the superintendents feel a policy is needed and the other half do not. 
The group seemed unsure why the superintendents were split on this issue. There was not 
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a lot of discussion by the group, because they did not seem to know, but one of the group 
members said: "The health department will make the decision as to schools being closed 
or not, but then what happens with Board policy? It would not necessarily be the same 
for every district." The group indicated that there is some conflict in terms of not feeling 
policy is warranted, but then when challenged superintendents say that you need to have 
a plan. "So is it that you would just develop the plan in the event that it was needed, 
rather than having a policy?'" Another person said: "I think it's that superintendents are 
not exactly sure what they want to do, that's how I would interpret the survey results 
regarding policy." 
When asked if districts should have policies regarding people staying home when 
they are ill the group had more thoughts on this issue. The school nurse indicated that a 
policy of this nature is pretty generic. She said: 
It is somewhat of an overall guidance type of policy; procedures and guidelines 
that get specific may be more appropriate than a policy. A policy recommending 
staying home when you are ill would have to include a definition of the meaning 
of "ill", which would be difficult. Who is going to define what is ill? The district 
should have some basic guidelines not to expect you to attend work or school if 
you are ill when you may be highly contagious. 
A participant in the group mentioned that a policy regarding staying home when 
you are ill could be a "double-edged sword" for districts too. ''I mean as an employer you 
are setting yourself up if you are telling people they are not expected to be there when 
they are ill. Having a policy on this will not allow districts to take punitive action for 
people being out.·· The school nurse suggested that districts should have a policy that 
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requires people who are out for more than a certain number of days (e.g., four days in a 
row, must obtain documentation from their physician upon their return). 
The group felt that schools do not need a policy for every type of medical 
emergency. The school physician said: "My medical book is thick and I don't think we 
need a policy for every single medical condition. I think we need a general policy for 
dealing with children with serious or life-threatening medical conditions, but not each 
one individually, and I think this is the same for disasters that could impact on school 
closure''. 
Responsibility for.feeding students. The group was asked to discuss why they 
thought all superintendents felt they do not have responsibility for feeding students who 
rely on free and reduced meals when school is closed for extended periods. The group· s 
response was similar to the superintendents interviewed. A participant in the group said: 
.. Lef s face it. when we are closed for vacations and summer we do not feed kids during 
those times.'' Another mentioned that: '·My understanding is that one of the key elements 
of having a preparedness plan is that there are children whose only food source is school 
lunch and school breakfast, and so when we first started doing this I thought the 
transportation was a key element in picking up those kids and getting them in for food ... 
Another pai1icipant said: "You know you can look at it as a superintendent, providing 
food is not really a schoors job. It is a community health issue.'' 
Annual training. The group was asked to discuss their thoughts on the CDC 
recommendations for annual training of staff and students on the use of non-medical 
ways to reduce the spread of influenza, and the fact that about 40% of the superintendents 
surveyed did not believe this training should be mandatory. One group member replied: 
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" I don ·t think they're saying that it is not important. They' re just saying that they have so 
many mandates, and to try to throw one more thing in there is difficult". Another 
participant said: 
If you look at it from financial viewpoint, and if kids are not covering their 
mouths and teachers are not having them wash their hands, and people are not 
communicating how to reduce the spread of influenza, then schools are going to 
have more teachers and students out ill. The district wi ll potentially lose money 
by paying substitute teachers and loosing state aid that schools get for attendance. 
In addition, if the kids are not in school they're not learning. \Vhen 
superintendents say ifs a public health concern, it is, but it is also a school 
concern. If you want kids to be in school and you want teachers and staff to be 
there, this type of training helps keep people healthy and in school. 
Paying sr~ff. The next item discussed by the group was whether or not all staff 
should be paid their full salaries while schools are closed long term. The focus group 
agreed with the superintendents by indicating that staff should be paid only if the 
government does not penalize districts when they are closed. They also thought that if 
staff is paid, they should work from home, if they are able, in an effort to support 
educating students while schools are closed. 
lnteragency collaboration. The group was asked to discuss the need for 
interagency collaboration. A group participant said : "It needs to be coordinated. I mean 
everybody needs to get the same message. You can·t have two districts in one county 
making two different recommendations; I think that would be confusing . ., 
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The group was asked to comment on whether or not BOCES should continue the 
pandemic planning task force even though over 50% of the superintendents did not 
believe it was BOCES duty to establish a task force. but rather the county health 
department's responsibility. One group member said: "Maybe there needs to be a little 
bit more of a fonn al agreement that if this committee is to continue, because it's a time 
commitment that we're all keeping and with 56% of the superintendents either unsure or 
don·t think we should be doing this. I don 't want to waste my time, because they're not 
going to listen:· The other group members agreed. 
The group agreed that while their focus has been pandemics, they thought they 
should be talking about community-wide disasters, natural disasters, terrorist disasters, 
biological disasters, and not just focus on pandemics. 
OTlzer comments. When the group was asked if they had any additional comments 
about the issue one participant mentioned that there was a great deal of media hype 18 
months ago and it seemed that President Bush was trying to distract us from the war and 
now no one is talking about pandemic influenza anymore. Another member added: 
I have to agree; is this really dangerous or is it perceived? Superintendents don't 
seem to feel ifs a real danger if they're saying it's not going to happen in the next 
10 years. 1 don·t know how I would answer it: I mean how would all of us 
answer that? Do you think a pandemic is going to happen in the next 10 years? 
A participant in the group said: 
No, I honestly believe, a more localized long-tenn closure might happen. l mean 
Columbine was closed for weeks, you know, actually a month and a half. or so. lt 
was near the end of the year, but that type of long-tenn closure can happen and 
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whatever is the case, if ifs biological, it doesn ·t have to be large scale, and it can 
be small. We actually put long term closure into our emergency plan based on the 
fact that many things could cause an extended closure. We did not focus on a 
pandemic. 
Another member of the group agreed and indicated that the emergency plan or policy 
does not need to focus necessarily on a pandemic. but anything that could potentially 
cause extended school closure. The school physician said: 
I don't think that we're going to encounter a pandemic of that level; I have 
incredible faith in the public health system in the United States. I think the third 
world countries may suffer a catastrophic outcome from a pandemic. China may 
be at risk for a catastrophic outcome if they do not improve their public health 
structure. But you know, SARS was contained in Canada and SARS was not 
even an issue in the United States, and J do not believe that a catastrophic 
pandemic in the United States is going to happen. I have faith in the CDC, and 
think CDC is world class, and that there is nothing out there better. However, l 
do believe that Superintendents need to think about the impact of long-tem1 
school closure and I don·t think they have. 
Another participant in the group suggested that: 
We have shifted our focus from global catastrophe to pandemics and 1 think it was 
pretty clear from the outset that this group felt very strongly it needed to be 
broader and 1 would like to sec that presented back to superintendents in a broader 
way to see what their response would be. I think we need to finalize our template 
and maybe beef it up a little bit more. focus on all types of disasters that could 
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cause long-term school closure, provide specifics and present it to the 
superintendents as something that you need to adopt in some capacity whether its 
policy, guidelines, or regulation. 
Focus group summary. In general, the focus group agreed with the survey results 
and the comments made by the superintendents who were interviewed. However, the 
school physician thought that schools should take responsibi lity for feeding students who 
receive free or reduced priced meals when schools are closed for extended periods. This 
is contrary to the survey data and the interview results. The majotity of the focus group 
does not believe a pandemic that causes extended school closure county-wide will occur 
within the next ten years. In addition, they do not think that they should continue 
working as a task force on this issue if school superintendents do not support their efforts. 
If they continue as a task force, they believe they need to broaden their focus beyond 
pandemic planning. They think it would be more sensible to address all types of 
emergency disasters that could cause long-tem1 school closure (e.g., natural disasters, 
ten-orist events, or community-wide di sasters). TI1e group felt that they should, at least, 
for the coming year prepare a .. draft ex tended school closure policy and a set of 
procedures"' that districts could consider using if they desire. Although there was talk of 
discontinuing as a task force, based on the superintendents· Jack of interest, the group 
decided that the Chair would schedule a meeting in the fall to discuss future efforts. 
Unanticipated Resulls 
This section briefly describes the researcher· s comments on unanticipated results 
identified during the study. In chapter V further details about the implications for these 
results will be giYen. In general, there were three unanticipated results that surprised the 
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researcher. The first unanticipated result was that school superintendents do not have a 
clear understanding of who has the authority to close all county schools in the event of a 
pandemic. This uncertainty could result in delays in school closings if a pandemic were 
to occur, thereby jeopardizing the health of students and the community. The second 
unanticipated result was that school superintendents are essentially equally divided on 
whether or not a school board policy on extended school closure is needed. Half of the 
superintendents believe a board policy would be prudent and establish the process used to 
develop plans and procedures. The other half of the supe1intendents do not believe a 
policy is necessary for extended school closure due to pandemic influenza. There is 
essentially no consensus on this issue. The final unanticipated result was that over 50% of 
the superintendents were not sure or did not believe BOC ES should coordinate a task 
force to address the issue of pandemic influenza planning in schools. The existing task 
force was established through the BOCES Environmental Health and Safety Service in an 
effort to provide a cooperative service to help support local schools with their planning 
efforts. Without more of the superintendents· support on this issue, the task force felt 
that they could not be effective. The task force felt that if superintendents do not believe 
their work is needed then they would not listen to the task forces' recommendations. 
Conclusion 
During a U.S. Department of Health and Human Sen·ices (HHS) leadership 
forum held on June 13, 2007, Stephanie A. MarshalL Director of Pandemic 
Communications. described how community leaders think. Ms. Marshall used various 
terms to describe community leaders' responses regarding how they felt about preparing 
for a pandemic. Some of these terms she used to categorize various community leaders 
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thoughts included: "disbelievers ... '·unengaged", '·fatalists'·, "preparers··, "avoiders .. , 
·'unable" and "influencers'·. 
This study essentially concurs with Ms. Marshall's descriptions. Based on 
superintendent responses provided during the study they too could be placed into these 
categories. The study found that some superintendents were unengaged by saying ··Jt's 
not important enough to spend time on right now ... Few indicated that --preparing won·t 
help anyway .. and they could be categorized as fatalists. Others were seen as preparers 
who said --rve already begun preparing and continue to work on it". Many could be 
considered avoiders because they said: ··1 can't deal with it right now. and there are too 
many other more important issues to tend to'·. Few would be considered influencers 
because they said ··It's not my job'". Finally, many superintendents could be seen as 
disbelievers because they indicated that: " I don't believe it is a real problem right now". 
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Chapter V: Discussion 
Jntroducrio11 
Schools play an important part in protecting the health of their students, staff and 
the community from highly contagious, infectious diseases such as seasonal or pandemic 
influenza. Research conducted by the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
and others suggest that community-wide school closures may lessen the prevalence of 
pandemic influenza, thereby reducing its affect on people and the economy. The public 
health belief is that timely closure of schools may limit the spread of pandemic influenza. 
This study investigated the question: What are the perceptions of school 
superintendents and a community task force regarding the health. pedagogical. social, and 
economic planning decisions for long-term school closure due to pandemic influenza? 
Tlu·ee research methods were used sequentially to collect data: a survey of 
superintendents in an upstate county in New York State, interviews of three 
supe1intendents to help interpret survey responses. and a focus group consisting of 
members of a task force charged with the responsibility to draft possible policies for 
schools. The primary themes that emerged from the data were provided in Chapter IV. 
Taken together. these data describe, at least in part, the current thinking of these 
stakeholders regarding local K- 12 public school pol icy issues related to extended school 
closures due to pandemic influenza. 
The implications or actions that should be considered in light of the results as they 
relate to the literature. future practice and future research are provided in this chapter. 
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The recommended actions are based on the research literature as well as the beliefs and 
practices of local school superintendents and the other stakeholders participating in this 
study. 
implications for Future Research 
This study shows that school superintendents are essentially not in agreement 
with many of the recommendations provided in the literature. While many of the 
recommendations for schools described in the literature are direct, some are implied. 
Table 18 lists the recommendations for schools that emerged from the literature, the 
literature sources, and the percent of superintendents who agreed on the survey with the 
recommendations. 
Table 18 illustrates that school superintendents do not embrace all of the 
recommendations for schools that are found in the literature. This resistance to some of 
the recommendations could bring about potential adverse implications on the community 
and students in the event extended school closures are necessary. 
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Table 18 
Superintendents Reactions to the Recommendations Found in the Literature 
Recommendations from the Literature sources Percentage of 
literature superintendents 
who agreed 
with the 
literature 
lnteragency collaboration is CDC (2006), New York State 93% 
necessary when responding to a Education Department (2007) 
pandemic 
Alternative learning options are DHHS (Dec. 9, 2006). 80% 
needed when schools close for 
extended periods 
Staff should be paid when schools CDC (2006), Hodge, et al., 67% 
are closed for extended periods (2008). 
At least once a year, students DHHS and CDC (2006) 62% 
faculty and staff shall be educated 
on non-medical ways to reduce the 
spread of influenza 
Policy on extended school closure DHHS and CDC (2006), Kahn 53% 
is needed (2007) 
An influenza pandemic is highly Harvard (2006), Tamblyn and 42% 
likely Tam (2003), US Department of 
Education, (2007) 
Superintendents have a clear Hodge, et al. (2008). 0% 
understanding of who has the 
authority to close all schools in the 
event of a pandemic 
Districts are responsible for feeding DHHS and CDC (2006) 0% 
students who receive subsidized 
meal programs when schools are 
closed for extended periods 
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The following subsections describe how this study supports existing literature 
related to extended school closure due to pandemic influenza, and provides 
recommendations for further research. 
Probability a pandemic will occur. The literature suggests that, "many experts 
believe the question is not whether there will be another pandemic, but when" (Harvard, 
2006, p 8). Even though the literature indicates that the United States is due for a 
pandemic event, this study suggests that preparing for extended school closure due to 
pandemic influenza does not appear to be a priority for school superintendents. 
Participants offered several reasons for this low priority designation: the main one being 
that addressing the issue takes them away from their primary role, which is student 
learning and success. The perceptions of school superintendents are that it is more 
important to focus their efforts on the daily educational needs of students than to prepare 
for extended school closure due to an influenza pandemic. 
The United States Department of Education website 
http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/pandemic/index.html, February 
14, 2008, page 1, indicates that scientists predict that the world is due for an influenza 
pandemic, a global outbreak from a new strain of influenza. The literature suggests that 
the threat of a human influenza pandemic has greatly increased over the past several 
years with the emergence of highly virulent avian influenza viruses (Fauci, 2006). In 
response to this potential threat, in August, 2006, the New York State (NYS) 
Commissioners of Education and Health coauthored a letter to NYS School District 
Superintendents and School Board members asking them to work closely with their local 
health departments to prepare schools for an influenza pandemic. This information 
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heightened the awareness oflocal schools about pandemic preparedness and the potential 
for extended school closures. At that time, schools began to think about how it would 
impact their operations and started to develop plans to address the issue. However, since 
the issuance of the coauthored letter (NYS Health and Education Departments, 2006), 
there has been little additional guidance or information provided directly to school 
superintendents regarding the issue. 
While the literature suggests that there is an increased threat of a pandemic, the 
majority of school superintendents and other stakeholders who participated in this study 
do not believe a pandemic will occur and cause extended school closure within the next 
ten years. How much should school superintendents worry about pandemic influenza? 
According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008): 
In answering questions of this kind, most people use what is called the availability 
heu1istic. They assess the likelihood of risks by asking how readily examples 
come to mind. If people can easily think of relevant examples, they are far more 
likely to be frightened and concerned than if they cannot. A risk that is familiar, 
like that associated with terrorism in the aftermath of 9111, will be seen as more 
serious than a risk that is less familiar, like that associated with sunbathing or 
hotter summers. Homicides are more available than suicides, and so people tend 
to believe, wrongly, that more people die from homicide. (p. 25) 
Based on this theory, most school superintendents have never experienced a pandemic 
and are unfamiliar with the risk it presents. They cannot readily think of a time when 
schools were closed for extended periods due to a pandemic, and therefore, do not believe 
the risk is great. 
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The study participants mentioned that there was a great deal of media "hype" 
about an imminent pandemic 18 months ago and wondered if it is a real or perceived 
danger. They also mentioned "often when a social issue is raised, schools become the 
primary audience to address the problem." It seems that the lack of experience school 
superintendents have had with an actual pandemic, and the inaction of the state health 
department and state education department in keeping the issue of pandemic 
preparedness at the forefront of school superintendents' agenda, has caused many of them 
to question whether the threat is real. This lack of experience and continuous information 
to superintendents about the pandemic threat appear to be major factors in their beliefs. 
While the threat may or may not be real, this research adds to the literature by 
providing the perceptions of actual school leaders who are faced with dealing with the 
issue. Superintendents appear to need more proof of a pandemic as a threat before they 
expend time and begin thinking how to plan for one. Future research on how 
superintendents decide to act on perceived threats may help determine how to get them to 
understand that preparing for such events is important. 
Policy issues. This study suggests that school superintendents are divided on 
whether or not a school board policy on extended school closure is needed. Most 
superintendents do not believe a separate board policy is required, although the majority 
do think that procedures should be developed and incorporated into existing school 
emergency plans. The literature (Kahn, 2007) implies that schools should have policies 
related to extended school closure and pandemic preparedness. Without policies or plans 
related to extended school closures, schools will not be prepared to respond to a 
pandemic event. Kahn (2007) reports that there are only two states and four localities in 
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the northeastern United States that have policies for extended school closures. Holmberg 
et al. (2006) suggests that state pandemic plans in the United States represent a 
"patchwork" without central coordination or direction, which appears to be reflected in 
the community associated with this study. These concerns are especially pertinent for 
school closure decisions during an influenza pandemic. There did not appear to be 
consensus on what organization should be responsible for this coordination. Whether or 
not school superintendents decide to have a policy on extended school closure, they all 
agreed that procedures should be in place in the event a future pandemic occurs. 
This study suggests that most superintendents recognize the need for a unified 
policy or plan, but that the responsibility for coordination lies elsewhere beyond, but 
including the school districts. Future research should address whether or not school 
policies on the issue of extended school closure would be prudent. It should examine 
whether or not incorporating plans and procedures without a policy is sufficient. 
Research on the number of districts that have policies related to extended school closure 
and the substance of those policies would help to determine the prevalence and content of 
policies on this issue. 
Responsibility for feeding students. Even though the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) checklist (2006) recommends that schools develop plans for 
feeding students receiving free and reduced-priced meals when schools close for 
extended periods, all superintendents participating in the research agreed that providing 
subsidized meals while schools are closed was not their responsibility. While the 
literature suggests that schools should have plans to provide subsidized meals, the 
superintendents indicated that their schools are not set up financially or logistically to 
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provide meals to students when schools are closed, and that there are not systems in place 
to provide such services. The superintendents in this study suggest that the CDC 
recommendations on this issue may not be feasible for most districts. Future research 
should examine options for feeding students, who receive subsidized meals, during 
extended school closures. The research should address how districts might collaborate 
with food pantries and other food supply sources so that students receiving subsidized 
meals are fed during long-term school closure. 
Annual training. Thjs study shows that superintendents agree that some form of 
training on infection control should be provided; however, they do not think it should be 
mandatory. The literature (CDC, 2006) suggests that schools provide this type of training 
at least annually. The superintendents in this study wondered about how to provide this 
training and when. Superintendents thought that it could be offered to students during 
health education classes. While health education standards in New York State cover 
infectious disease, not all students at every grade level are required to receive health 
education. Most districts integrate heath education somewhere throughout the K-12 
curriculum, but it is not offered to all K-12 students every year. Also, teachers might not 
cover this type of training unless they are directed to do so by the superintendent. This 
study suggests that, unless information about pandemics is embedded in existing 
curriculum, the recommendations from the literature are not realistic in light of other 
learning and professional development demands. 
This study showed that superintendents agree that some form of training in 
practical ways to prevent disease should be provided to staff and students. However, they 
are not sure how to implement the training and what should be included. Future research 
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could focus on strategies to incorporate this training into existing curriculum and 
different options schools may use to offer it to staff and students. 
Alternative learning options. The Department of Health and Human Services' 
checklist (DHHS, Dec. 9, 2006) recommends that schools develop alternate procedures to 
ensure the continuity of instruction in the event of district-wide school closures. While 
school superintendents agree with this recommendation, there are few strategies in place 
to do so locally. Few suggestions exist in the literature on ways school districts may 
easily implement continuity of instruction programs while closed for extended periods. 
Future research should examine methods to educate students, which schools could 
realisticaJJy implement quickly, when they close for extended periods. This study 
suggests that superintendents do not have an organized approach to offering alternative 
teaching methods as suggested by the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Communication methods. The literature (CDC, 2006) suggests that schools be 
prepared and have a process to communicate with staff and students when schools are 
closed for extended periods. This study showed that most schools have adequate means to 
communicate with employees, parents and students in the event of extended school 
closure. These methods include: news media, telephone, or web sites. According to 
superintendent responses, how to effectively coordinate this type of communication has 
not been articulated. They appear to be aware of the methods, but a plan for accessing 
and using these tools does not appear to be present. Research demonstrating practical 
methods that school districts can use to uniformly communicate unified messages to their 
constituents is needed. 
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Paying staff.' After Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Education Department sent 
out a statement to schools showing its willingness to work with states hit by the hurricane 
especially concerning waivers and modifications, teacher requirements, reallocations of 
funds, and supplemental appropriations (Hodge, et al., 2008). Similar waivers would be 
needed in New York State in the event oflong-term school closures. During the January 
24, 2007, school-closure, discussion-based-exercise workshop sponsored by the New 
York State Department of Health, New York State Education Department, and New York 
State Emergency Management office the issue of paying staff when schools are closed 
for extended periods was raised. It is unknown what the effect of long-term closure 
would have on school funding in New York State. It is clear that schools would need 
regulatory relief since school districts get state funding based on average daily attendance 
records. Current bargaining agreements do not have provisions for paying staff while 
schools are closed. This study adds to the literature on school closings by offering 
superintendents opinions on whether staff should be paid. Superintendents believe staff 
should continue to be paid when schools are closed for extended periods as long as 
districts continue to receive state funding while schools are closed. Future research on 
the legal implications of paying staff while schools are closed is needed. School districts 
should consult with their legal advisors to detennine their legal obligations regarding 
paying staff when schools are closed for extended periods. 
Critical functions needed to continue operations. After Hurricane Katrina, schools 
that were not damaged during the stonn remained open as shelters. In the event of a 
pandemic, schools may need to be opened and as points of distribution sites (PODS) for 
dispensing medication. This study showed that school superintendents think certain 
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operations will need to be maintained even when schools are closed. These critical 
functions include such items as facilities operations (boilers, phones, and web-site), 
payroll and business services, school communications, and alternative instruction. These 
items will need to continue to help maintain the school infrastructure and enable school 
leaders lo communicate with their constituents. Schools will need to develop plans to 
keep these operations functional if schools arc closed. They will need back-up plans in 
the event those individuals who manage these areas cannot report to work due to illness. 
This study adds to the school literature by demonstrating a need to keep school buildings 
open even while students are dismissed for extended periods. Future research should 
examine the critical functions that need to continue when schools close for extended 
periods. It should address how these critical functions will be carried out when schools 
close for extended periods. 
School employees expected to report to work. In carrying out the critical functions 
mentioned above, certain staff will need to report to work. Even though students may be 
dismissed from school for extended periods the facilities may be needed for other 
purposes such as temporary shelters, points of distribution for medical supplies, or care 
centers. During Hurricane Katrina, approximately a third of schools in New Orleans 
were closed due to physical damage and not necessarily to prevent the spread of disease 
(Hodge, et. al, 2008). Some of those facilities not damaged were used for the purposes 
listed above (Hodge, et al., 2008). This study documents superintendents' beliefs 
regarding the need for facilities staff, payroll staff, some instructional staff, and 
themselves to report to work when schools are closed, if they are able. Future research 
on the legal implications of requiring certain staff to report to work while schools are 
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closed is needed. School districts should consult with their legal advisors to determine 
their legal obligations as to requiring certain staff to report to work when schools are 
closed for extended periods. 
School ernployees expected to work from home. In an effort to provide alternative 
instruction to students while schools are closed for extended periods, teaching staff may 
be expected to work from home. The majority of school superintendents expect staff to 
work from home during a pandemic, if they are able. This line of thinking is in 
agreement with the current literature (CDC, 2006). Allowing staff the option to work 
from home could lessen the societal impact by encouraging families to continue working, 
even though it is from home, without fear of employment loss (Hodge, et. al, 2008). This 
study adds to the school closure literature by demonstrating some agreement among 
school superintendents regarding the issue of employees working from home dUiing a 
pandemic. 
The majority of superintendents believe most staff should be expected to work 
from home, if able, when schools are closed for extended periods. Further research on 
what staff will be expected to do and how their work may be accomplished is needed. 
Authority to close all county schools. Making the decision to close schools for 
extended pe1iods in response to pandemic influenza will significantly impact the 
community and students. CDC has reported on the community impact of school closures 
on families and the workforce in its Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance (2007). It 
recognizes four major areas of concern, including the potential: (a) adverse economic 
impact on families, (b) disruption of businesses, (c) reduced access to essential goods and 
services, and ( d) disruption of school related services. 
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This study showed that school superintendents are unclear who has the authority 
to close all county schools in the event of a pandemic. This suggests that express legal 
authority to close schools may be lacking or at least confusing for school superintendents. 
The majority of superintendents believe that the county health director likely can close 
schools when there is a public health emergency. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in January 2007 the New York State Department of 
Health, New York State Education Department, and New York State Emergency 
Management office sponsored a school closure discussion-based exercise workshop. 
During the workshop it was reported that New York State's " trigger" to close schools in a 
severe pandemic influenza event is one laboratory confirmed community case in the 
county, and schools would remain closed for 12 weeks. During the workshop, a need was 
identified that the trigger discussion needs to be held with local health departments and 
communities, so that decisions can be made proactively rather than reactively. During the 
workshop it was reported that the legal authority to close school district schools remains 
with the superintendent of that district. 
Following Hurricane Katrina the decisions to close schools were made on a 
district-by-district basis (Hodge, et al., 2008). There was no statewide closure of schools 
before or after the hurricane by the Health Department, Education Department or the 
Governor (Hodge, et al., 2008). 
In November 2006 in Yancee County, North Carolina schools were closed in 
response to an outbreak of influenza B virus. While local officials were able to contain 
the spread of disease, disagreements among state and local government officials as to the 
efficacy of school closures as a control measure illustrate the potential for delays or 
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resistance to efficient statewide school closures in response to pandemic influenza 
(Hodge, et. al, 2008). 
As mentioned above, the study showed that superintendants are uncertain who has 
the authority to close all county schools. This uncertainty could result in delays in 
closing if a pandemic were to occur, thereby jeopardizing the health of students and the 
community. The superintendents in this study could face a similar situation as those 
recorded in the literature, which may result in similar confusion. Future research to 
examine who has the authority to close all county schools to reduce the impact posed by a 
pandemic is needed. 
lnteragency collaboration. The literature (CDC, 2006) implies that interagency 
collaboration is crucial for the community-wide preparation of a pandemic. Even though 
most superintendents do not think a pandemic causing extended school closure will occur 
within the next ten years, they all think interagency collaboration is necessary to prepare 
for such an event. They do not believe schools should be the lead agency in this 
collaborative effort, but do believe schools should be part of the planning process. Many 
superintendents were against or unsure whether or not BOCES should coordinate a task 
force to address the issue of extended school closure. They thought that the county health 
department or emergency management office would be a better choice. They stressed the 
importance that schools are involved with the collaborative process. The superintendents 
appear to agree with the recommendations of the literature for interagency collaboration, 
but see themselves as a member of the team not necessarily the key leader of the effort. 
Future research on how to incorporate schools into interagency collaborative efforts is 
needed. 
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Implications for Future Practice and Recommendations.for the Local County 
This section provides a summary of recommendations made by the author based 
on his study's findings. It includes recommendations for future practice and actions that 
the county, local schools and BOCES regional pandemic planning task force should 
consider. It includes recommendations for changes in organizational procedures and 
practices for the local districts and community addressed in this action research study. 
lnteragency collaboration. The study showed that most superintendents were 
unsure or against BOCES coordinating a task force to address extended school closure 
due to pandemic influenza. Those against BOCES coordinating such a task force felt the 
local health department or emergency management office should be responsible to take 
the lead, and should invite school representatives to attend their planning sessions. The 
county health department currently has a group that addresses pandemic preparedness 
called the " Bio-Terrorism and Communicable Disease Task Force". Through the 
BOCES cooperative health and safety service superintendents could be notified of 
county-wide efforts to prepare for a pandemic. This may be accomplished by having a 
BOCES representative from the health and safety service participate on the county's Bio-
Terrorism and Communicable Disease Task Force and attend any local or state sponsored 
sessions on the issue. The BOCES representative should report back to the BOCES 
District Superintendent. The District Superintendent then should provide the information 
to school superintendents. Having a BOCES representative actively participate in 
interagency meetings would provide a liaison for school district input and 
communication. The BOCES representative would be able to offer the school districts_ 
perspectives during the planning process. 
92 
One action the BOCES regional pandemic planning task force needs to consider is 
whether or not to continue their efforts, or be subsumed by the county's Bio-Terrorism 
and Communicable Disease Task Force. With over 50% of the superintendents uncertain 
or who do not believe it is BOCES duty to establ ish a task force, but rather the county 
health department" s responsibility, maybe a BOC ES lead task force is not necessary. 
One focus group member said: '·Maybe there needs to be a little bit more of a fon11al 
agreement if this task force is to continue, because ifs a time commitment that we're all 
keeping and with 56% of the superintendents either unsure or don't think we should be 
doing this, J don't want to waste my time, because they're not going to listen." The other 
group members agreed. 
The focus group thought that the task force should consider expanding their 
efforts to encompass all emergency situations that could cause extended school closure. 
This may be a good idea as long as they obtain buy-in from the school superintendents. 
If they decide to do this. the task force would need to establish a mission and goals that 
the school superintendents should approve in advance. 
While the superintendents were not sure whether or not a BOCES coordinated 
task force was needed, the majority did think that it would be helpful to have an example 
school closure policy and procedures that they could share with their school boards for 
discussion purposes. The author recommends that the local pandemic planning task force 
prepare a draft policy and procedures that superintendents can consider with their school 
boards. While each school districf s procedures will have to be crafted specifically to 
meet their individual needs, a draft policy and procedure would be a helpful starting point 
fo r them to consider when updating their existing emergency management plans. After 
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that, if the task force decides not to continue as a group they can disband. If they decide 
to break up, a process should remain in place to notify schools of county-wide efforts to 
prepare for a pandemic event. 
Authority to close all county schools. Each school superintendent has the 
authority to close his or her school district in the event of an emergency. While the 
literature (Hodge, et al., 2008) suggests that the effective use of school closure is a 
community strategy to reduce the impact of pandemic influenza, school superintendents 
are unsure who has the authority to close all county schools. This lack of certainty may 
result in disagreement or delays in implementing school closure as superintendents and 
other local and state government authorities debate whether, when, and how to close 
schools (Hodge, et al., 2008). This uncertainty may preclude timely, consistent 
implementation of school closure decisions at the local level. 
The author recommends that the BOCES superintendent discuss the school 
closure issue with the Commissioner of Education, county health director, the county 
executive, and their legal counsel to help clarify who has the authority to close all county 
schools in the event of a pandemic and how it will be accomplished. They should attempt 
to work out any recognized issues that may delay successful implementation of school 
closure as a social distancing measure. As a result of the meetings the BOCES 
superintendent should confinn an agreed upon extended school closure process that 
BOCES, the local school districts, and the county health department can incorporate into 
their emergency plans. Once this mechanism is established, the BOC ES supe1intendent 
should share it with the local school superintendents who should then incorporate it into 
their district emergency plans. 
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Another recommendation would be that BOCES health and safety service or the 
local pandemic planning task force facilitates a tabletop exercise for school 
superintendents during their annual retreat. The tabletop exercise is a simple exercise 
requiring minimal preparation. It is an excellent vehicle for training officials and other 
key responders and decision makers in selected components of school district safety 
plans. Its purpose is to detect potential problems with coordination and to detem1ine the 
appropriateness of assigned responsibilities. It also reveals potential problems in 
response procedures and can help detem1ine requirements for further training. To 
undertake the exercise, school superintendents would gather in an informal setting, such 
as a conference room, and are presented with a scenario and related problems devised by 
BOCES health and safety service or the local pandemic planning task force. For example, 
the scenario will be an identified hazard. such as an impending pandemic that will require 
the extended closure of schools county-wide. This kind of setting is conducive to free 
discussion, and participants have the opportunity to practice solving relatively simple 
problems in a low-stress environment. The goal of the tabletop exercise would be to 
identify and discuss actions that would need to be taken within county school districts by 
school superintendents to maximally protect the health and safety of students, staff and 
school community during a pandemic situation. The exercise objectives would be to 
identify essential communication and coordination for emergency response activities that 
would maximize the protection for all county students and staff, test county-wide 
commw1ication procedures, and to identify staff responses and responsibilities. 
Alternative learning options. Most superintendents thought that continuity of 
instruction was important in the event of extended school closure. However, few have 
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concrete plans to provide such education. Most superintendents suggested technology, 
such as distance learning, and web-based learning as a means to continue student 
instruction. The local task force should work with BOCES Technology Services 
Department to establish a procedure to accomplish this goal. BOCES purpose is to serve 
students in non-traditional ways, and to provide school districts with shared technology 
services. Developing and implementing a learning system for schools if they need to 
close for extended periods is aligned with BOCES purpose. 
Responsibility for feeding students. The study clearly shows that school 
superintendents do not believe feeding students who rely on subsidized meal plans is 
their responsibility when schools are closed for extended periods. In the case of a true 
pandemic school leaders should ask themselves in advance if school food service workers 
could repo11 to work to prepare meals and have transportation staff deliver it to students 
in need. 
The implications here suggest that during extended school closures other means to 
provide food to students receiving subsidized meals should be researched and considered. 
The county health department's Bio-Terrorism and Communicable Disease Task Force 
should be made aware that school superintendents do not think it is their responsibility to 
feed students who rely on subsidized meal plans during a pandemic. The county needs to 
look into other options for providing food, such as food pantries, meals-on-wheels, or the 
Red Cross. This is something the county health department should investigate prior to an 
extended school closure event. 
Probability a pandemic will occur. Unless more evidence is provided on a 
continuous basis that the threat of a pandemic could cause extended school closure, 
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school superintendents· preparation effotis may remain minimal. Most superintendents 
do not believe that a pandemic that will cause extended school closure will occur within 
the next ten years. The task force should consider contacting the county and state health 
departments to see what the likelihood of such an event really is. If it seems that it is 
more likely than not, the task force could work on heightening the awareness of the 
supe1intendents by routinely providing them with updates on the topic and suggested 
planning activities. The task force should consider broadening their focus to address other 
issues that could cause extended school closures. The focus on pandemics may miss the 
point for the need to plan regardless of the reason for extended school closure. 
Annual training. Most superintendents thought that annual training in use of 
practical ways to reduce the spread of influenza, such as covering coughs and sneezes, 
washing hands, and staying home if you are sick was a good idea. but should not be 
mandated. Future practice should involve providing employees awareness training 
during faculty and staff meetings. The training should encourage teachers to review it 
each year with their students prior to the flu season. Most schools provide teachers and 
staff with annual Right-to-Know training and Blood-borne Pathogen Training as required 
by the New York State Public Employee Safety and Health (PESH) Bureau. They should 
incorporate hand-hygiene and respiratory etiquette into the annual PESH safety training 
that is required to be provided to all staff every year. The task force should develop a 
short training presentation that could be offered to districts dming annual employee 
Right-to-Know sessions or faculty and staff meetings. The task force could also develop 
or obtain and distribute grade appropriate training materials teachers could use to inform 
students about the impo1iance of proper hand hygiene and respiratory/cough etiquette. 
97 
Communication methods. Most school superintendents reported that they have 
adequate means to communicate to their school community during extended school 
closures. One implication is that there is not a regional coordinated effo1t in place that all 
districts use together to communicate to their constituents the same infonnation. Future 
practice should establish a coordinated effort so all communications throughout the 
region are unified. Prior to, and in the event of extended school closures, the BOCES 
superintendents along with the county health director should work together and develop a 
mutually agreed upon, unified message that all districts could use when communicating 
with their constituents. 
Paying staff Most superintendents agreed that paying staff during an extended 
school closure was appropriate. However, few had procedures in place on how this would 
be accomplished. This issue should be addressed in new bargaining agreements. 
Superintendents should consult with their legal advisors regarding this issue. 
School employees expected to report to work. Future practice would dictate that 
schools should plan and communicate who would be expected to report to work in 
advance of an extended school closure. They need to know what their responsibilities 
will be if schools are closed for extended periods. Back-up staff should be identified in 
advance too, just in case the primary staff was unable to report. School superintendents 
should consider that their facilities might be needed for other purposes besides education 
such as points of distribution for medical supplies. They should collaborate in advance 
with agencies who will likely use their facilities (e.g., Red Cross, Health Department) so 
that in the event of a pandemic superintendents will understand how their schools may be 
needed. 
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School employees expected to work from home. The majority of school 
superintendents think that staff should work from home if schools are closed for extended 
periods. Future practice that allows staff the option to work from home could lessen the 
societal impact by encouraging employees to work from home without fear of 
employment loss. Such arrangements afford flexibility to determine which member(s) 
should stay home to care for children (Hodge, et al., 2008). 
Teachers and staff would need to be informed in advance of what they are 
expected to do from home in the event of long-term school closure. Superintendents 
need to understand that employees may not have the wherewithal to work from home if 
they or their family members are ill. Bargaining agreement contracts do not address this 
issue, and future practice would dictate that teaching staff be informed in advance and be 
prepared to provide educational services from home in the event of extended school 
closure. Planning how this may be accomplished could be something the task force 
examines with the help ofBOCES Technology Services Department to assist school 
districts deal with this dilemma. 
Limitations 
This study confined itself to surveying and interviewing school superintendents in 
one county and was specific to the upstate 1ew York region where the research was 
conducted. The survey and face-to-face interviews only obtained the perceptions from 
school superintendents. It may have been helpful to get the perceptions from other school 
administrators, other county administrators, and others who have addressed the topic of 
extended school closure and pandemic influenza. All research participants represented 
suburban school districts. There were no rural school district participants involved in the 
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research. The purposive sampling procedure decreases the generalizability of findings. 
The study will not be generalizable to all K-12 public school systems; however, the 
findings may be helpful to other communities or school districts considering such plans. 
TI1e author of this study was a participating member of the county-wide schools 
pandemic planning task force. As an action research project this provided the author data 
for decision making in a real context. However, the findings could be subject to other 
interpretations. The results will be shared with superintendents who participated in the 
survey, interviewees and task force members so that other interpretations can be 
considered for decision-making purposes. 
Conclusion 
The research has focused on the impact an influenza pandemic could have on K-
12 school systems. It examined school policy issues related to long-term closure of 
schools. The need for planning and policies was examined to help establish a seamless 
response across the region between school districts and public health authorities. The 
research looked at responses school leaders may take to reduce the pedagogicaL 
community health, social, and economic impacts of a pandemic. The goal of the study 
was to examine K-12 school planning and policy issues addressing the topic oflong-term 
school closures due to pandemic influenza. 
During an influenza pandemic school districts may be asked to close for as long 
as 12 weeks to reduce contact among children and stop the spread of disease. School 
Superintendents' perceptions and attitudes were being sought regarding school planning 
and policy implications associated with long-term closure ofK-12 school districts. The 
data were gathered using three research methods: (a) electronic survey, (b) interviews, 
JOO 
and (c) focus group. Information and data were collected and examined from 19 school 
districts within two Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) supervisory 
districts. The research findings will be used to inform school and public health officials 
of the perceptions school district superintendents have regarding the potential for long-
term school closure due to pandemic influenza. Recommendations will be provided to 
school superintendents and the regional pandemic planning task force to help improve 
current planning efforts. Although no one knows for sure when the next pandemic will 
occur, or what new influenza virus will cause a pandemic, the impact on schools could be 
enormous. 
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Appendix A 
Enormity of the issue should a pandemic occur. 
Demograohic information on school districts and BOCES being examined as part of this study 
Descriptor Supervisory District Demographic 
District 
District I BOCES 2 The smallest of the County school districts has approximately 1, I 00 
pupils and two school buildings. Both the Elementary and High school 
are located in, a small , historic village ten miles south of a mid-sized 
city. Most village pupils walk to school. 
District 2 BOCESl T he School District features 10 schools, which enjoy a statewide and 
national reputation for excellence. K-3 students flourish in six 
neighborhood schools, where they receive individualized attention in a 
close-knit environment. Two 4-6 schools introduce students to a larger 
environment, while still offe1ing the support needed for each student 
to succeed. At the 7-8 levels, students enjoy a wide array of course 
offerings in addition to focused, integrated core courses. The High 
School serves the grades 9-12 population with a comprehensive 
program of offerings, including an Advanced Placement program. 
Total student population roughly 3000. 
District 3 BOCESl The School District has a student population of approximately 9,000 
students. lt is the County's fastest growing and second largest 
suburban school district. Located 8 miles outside a mid-sized city in 
New York. Scenic Lake Ontario to the north and a bay to the west 
border the Town. It covers 52 square miles and includes four 
townships. The district serves a primarily residential suburban 
community. The district's art and music programs rank among the best 
in the state. Thanks to a unique partnership with the Town, school 
district residents enjoy some of the finest athletic and recreational 
facilities available anywhere including a 50-meter swimming pool , 
multi-purpose field house and all-weather track. 
District 4 BOCES2 The School District is I 0 miles west of a mid-sized city in New York, 
in a "rural-suburban" community serving one town and parts of three 
other towns. The district maintains an active partnership with the 
Town in sharing athletic fields and school facilities. The district has a 
history of active community involvement with residents' input sought 
for budget advisory committees, key leader search committees, 
planning teams and sports and extra-curricular involvement. The 
district's total population is 22,234 with a student enrollment of 4,250. 
The annual district budget is approximately S61,000,000. 
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A d. A ppen 1x t con mue d 
Descriptor Supervisory District Demographic 
District 
District 5 BOCESl The School District is comprised of five elementary schools (K-5), 
two middle schools (6-8), a ninth grade academy (9), and one high 
school (10-12), which includes an alternative education program. The 
district is situated near mid-sized in New York State, 20 minutes south 
of Lake Ontario. The northern portion of the district is primarily 
commercial, while the southern portion is rural residential with an 
agricultural base. The district serves nearly 6,000 students. 
District 6 BOCESl Centralized in 1946, the School District encompasses 30 square miles 
including portions of six towns. The disttict's programs, staff and 
curriculum are considered among the best available in schools 
anywhere. Over I , 150 employees including teachers, administrators, 
and support staff provide quality services for an enrollment 
of approximately 6, I 00 students in nine school buildings. The per 
pupil cos t for 2007-2008 is approximately 516,433, with an operating 
budget of S 100,240,697. 
District 7 BOCESl The school is located in a suburb of a mid-sized city in New York 
State. The district covers nearly 50 square miles, including sections of 
six towns. The district serves approximately 4,900 students in grades 
K-1 2 at its s ix schools. 
District 8 BOCES 2 The school district is mainly rural and covers 89 square miles. The 
student enrollment is K-6: 434 7- 12: 522. There is a Jr. /Sr. high 
school and an elementary school. 
District 9 BOCESJ The 74-square mile school disttict is geographically the largest in the 
County. In fact, it sprawls across three county lines, and encompasses 
nine different towns. A progressive district located in the rolling 
countryside of the southern portion of the County, amid rmal 
ambiance and traditional horse country, spacious modem homes rub 
shoulders with well-kept Victorian town dwellings. The district 
population is approximately I 0,500 including a stimulating mix of 
newly arrived professionals, small business owners, farm families, and 
long-time residents. There are over 2700 students. The annual district 
budget is approximately $37,300,000.00. 
District I 0 BOCES 2 The Schoo] District has an enrollment of about 4,441 students. The 
District borders the shoreline of Lake Ontario in portions of four 
towns and is located 12 miles northwest of a mid-sized city in New 
York State. The District's five schools and transportation facility arc 
located on a 212-acre campus. The District has completed a $57 .9 
million capital project, which includes new classroom construction, 
renovation of existing space, parking and traffic improvements as well 
as new athletic fields and a new Aquatic Center. A ~9.5 million 
Maintenance and Renovation Project was approved in January 2007. 
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Descriptor Supervisory District Demographic 
District 
District 11 BOCES 2 The district is located in a northwest suburb of a mid-sized city in 
New York State bordering Lake Ontario. As the largest suburban 
district in the County, and the eighth-largest district in New York 
State, the school district serves a residential community with strong 
commercial and industrial base. Currently the district provides 
services for approximately 14,000 students in grades PreK-12 through 
three high schools, a middle/high school, three middle schools, and 12 
elementary schools. 
District 12 BOCES2 The school disttict serves two towns. The district covers a 26 square 
mile area in a community situated between Lake Ontario and the 
Finger Lakes. As a community next to a mid-sized city, it offers easy 
access to a va1iety of sporting events, cultural events, several colleges 
and universities. and employers. The district operates seven schools -
five elementary buildings housing grades K-5, a middle school for 
grades 6-8, and a high school for grades 9-12. The district population 
is 35,000 including over 5,000 students. The total annual budget is 
$71,199,124 
Dist1ict 13 BOCESI The district's enrollment is just over 7,000 students. There arc eight 
schools including: four elementary schools, two middle schools, one 
building for ninth graders, and one school for grades 10-12. Three 
schools opened in the early 1970s. three in the mid-l 960s, and two in 
the 1950s. There have been several additions and renovations over the 
years, and all schools are maintained in excellent condition. All 
schools have computer labs, with a district student-computer ratio of 
3: 1. They have complete cafeteria faci I ities and auditoriums 
(sometimes combined), library/media centers. and gymnasiums. The 
annual budget is about $94,000,000. 
District 14 BOCESl The School District serves a residential, easily accessible village of 
about 7.000, plus about 5.000 residents in parts of three towns. It is a 
walking district and the only district in the CowHy to house 14 grades 
-- pre-kindergarten through 12th -- in one building, which opened in 
September 1995. The campus houses three separate libraries, 
computer labs, gymnasiums, and cafeterias. while all students share 
use of the auditorium, indoor pool, and large-group classrooms. The 
district has an annual school budget of about 25,000,000.00 and 
student enrollment near 1500. 
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Appendix A continued 
Descriptor Supervisory District Demographic 
District 
District 15 BOCES1 The School District is located in New York, bordering a mid-sized 
city. lt serves a community of 33,000 residents in the eastern portion 
of the Town, adjacent to the city. The town is set against a backdrop of 
nahrral beauty, \vi th wooded hills and valleys, acres of nearby 
parkland and miles of water views. Bordering the town are a bay, Lake 
Ontario, public park and the Genesee River harbor area with its 
historic lighthouse and beach facilities. Residents enjoy a full 
spectrum of professional services, shopping. recreational and cultural 
offerings both in town and in the nearby city. The town is minutes 
away from the city with easy access to expressways and cotmty and 
state highways. The district is the oldest suburban area in the County. 
As such, it has undergone a number of demographic changes. As the 
population aged. student enrollments declined from a high of over 
6,000 students in the '70's to about 2,300 students in the mid <80's. 
Housing in the district remains affordable. This has attracted a number 
of younger families, which has caused a steady rebound in the student 
enrollment since the mid-eighties. The district has responded to 
continuing student growth by making more efficient use of existing 
space and by adding classrooms to existing schools. Continued student 
!!fowth is forecast for the rest of the decade. 
District 16 BOCES 2 The School District, located amidst rolling farmland and quiet 
residential neighborhoods, is minutes from a mid-sized city in upstate 
New York. The School District encompasses portions of three towns 
and has close to 2300 students. 
District 17 BOCES2 The school district is one of the oldest centralized distticts in the state 
covering some 72 square miles bordering the shore of Lake Ontario. 
Located on the banks of the histo1ic Erie Canal. The town is twenty 
miles west of a mid-sized city in New York State. The community 
offers the best suburban living combined with the cultural benefits of 
one of New York State's finest cities. The total District Population is 
30,000 with a student enrollment of 4,345. There are five schools as 
follows: One school for Universal Pre-K, one school for grades 2-3, 
one school for grades 4-5, one middle school and one high school. 
District 18 BOCES1 The School District is located in noriheastem New York in a family-
oriented community offering excellent public services and recreation 
to residents of all ages. The town includes attractive residential 
properties, small businesses and professional office buildings with 
convenient access to the neighboring City. The school district is a 
cosmopolitan community with people of diverse nationalities, 
religions and ethnic backgrounds. This district's population is: 26,000 
with a total enrollment (2005-06) of 3,675. School District Budget: 
approximately $54,000,000 The district has one primary school, one 
elementary schooL one middle school and a high school. 
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Descriptor Supervisory Distiict Demographic 
District 
BOCESI BOCES1 The NYS Legislature created boards of Cooperative Educational 
Services (BOCES) in 1948 to encourage school districts to partner to 
take advantage of their collective purchasing power and human 
resources to provide students with quality, cost-effective educational 
opportunities. By sharing costs and resources through BOCES, local 
districts are able to provide improved programs and services at 
considerable savings to local taxpayers. 
This BOCES operates more than 80 programs and services for area 
school districts. It is a major contributor to the recognized excellence 
of County schools and their ability to adapt to the rapidly changing 
needs of the community. The BOCES is one of 37 Boards of 
Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) in New York State, 
located in a suburb southeast of a mid-sized upstate New York city. 
BOCES 1 is a cooperative extension of the 10 County suburban school 
districts on the east side of the county. BOCES 1 employs nearly 2000 
staff members and offers more than 84 programs and services to meet 
the needs of over 5,500 students and community members, from 
newborns to senior citizens. 
BOCES2 BOCES 2 At this BOCES, approximately 900 full and part-time staff provides 
more than 74 separate services and serve more than 43,000 students in 
nine component school districts and serves the west side of the county. 
City City School Located in western New York along the shore of Lake Ontario, the 
School District city is the state's third largest city. It has a city population of219,773 
District and a metropolitan population of713,968. The City School Dishict 
serves approximately 34,000 students in pre-K through grade 12 and 
an additional 15,000 adult students in continuing education programs. 
It operates 39 elementary schools, 19 secondary schools, one 
adult/family learning center, and several alternative education 
programs. The ethnic makeup of the student population is 64 percent 
African American, 20 percent Hispanic, 14 percent white, and 2 
percent Native American, Asian, and other minorities. There are 35 
different lanwages spoken within the student population. 
109 
Appendix B 
Survey Instrument (Microsoft Word format) 
School District and BOCES Superintendents of Schools, Pandemic 
Planning and Policy Survey 
Introduction: The purpose of this survey is to estimate the influence that long-term 
school closures(~ 12 weeks) will exert on school districts throughout the county in the 
days or years ahead. During a pandemic school districts may be asked to close for as long 
as 12 weeks to reduce contact among children and stop the spread of disease. Your 
perceptions and attitudes are sought regarding community health, pedagogical, social and 
economic policy implications associated with long-term closure of K-12 school districts. 
Although no one knows for sure when the next pandemic \vill occur, or what new 
influenza virus will cause a pandemic, the impact on schools could be enormous. Your 
leadership on this vital issue is urgently needed. 
Please Circle your gender: 
Male Female 
Circle or write your ethnicity: 
e.g., Caucasian, African American, Hispanic, Asian, Etc: ____ _ 
Circle your age group: 
(<30-34) (35-39) (40-44) (45-49) (50-54) (55-60) (>60) 
Circle the number of years experience you have as a school superintendent: 
(<l) (I - 2) (2 - 4) (4 - 6) (6 - 8) (8 - 10) (>10) 
Circle your school district's student population: (<1000-3000) (3000-6000) 
(6000-9000) (9000-12000) ( 12000-15000) ( 15000-<50000) 
Directions: Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements by placing a check mark in the appropriate box then respond to all questions. 
Return this form to: David Duford 
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1. A pandemic requiring school closure for long-tetm (~ 12 weeks) will occur within 
one (1) year. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
2. A pandemic requiring long-term school closure within five (5) years will occur. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
3. A pandemic requiring long-tenn school closure within ten (10) years will occur. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
4. A school board policy related to long-tenn school closure is necessary. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
5. School districts should have policies that discourage employees and students from 
going to work/school when they have flu-like symptoms. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
I 11 
6. When schools close long-tenn districts have the responsibility for feeding 
students who rely on free and reduced-priced meals. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
If you agree, briefly describe how this may be accomplished? _ ______ _ 
7. Prior to a pandemic students, faculty and staff should be educated on how and 
why it is important to improve personal hygiene. For example, training in use of 
non-medical ways to reduce the spread of influenza such as covering coughs and 
sneezes, washing hands and staying home if your are sick. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
If you agree, briefly describe how this may be accomplished? _______ _ 
8. Alternative learning strategies should be implemented to educate students while 
school is closed long-term. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
If you agree, b1iefly describe how this may be accomplished? ___ _ ___ _ 
9. All staff should be paid their full salary while schools are closed long-tem1. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
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If you agree, briefly describe how this may be accomplished? ___ _ __ _ 
10. Interagency collaboration to ensure unified responses between school districts, 
BOCES', County health department and other agencies will be necessary before, 
dming and after a pandemic. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
If you agree, briefly describe how this may be accomplished? ______ _ 
11 . Some staff will be expected to work from home when schools close. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
If you agree, briefly desc1ibe whom this may apply to. ______ ___ _ 
12. Employees who will be expected to report to work when schools are closed for 
long periods include (circle all that apply) : 
A. None B. Principals C. Facilities staff 
D School Superintendent E. Food service staff F. Payroll staff 
G. Administrators l. Others? H. Transportation staff 
----
13. What individuals do you believe have the authority to close all Monroe County 
Schools for long periods, e.g., up to 12 weeks? (Circle all that apply) 
113 
A. County Health Director B. BOCES 1 Superintendent C. BOCES 2 
Superintendent D. Commissioner of Education 
E. County Executive F. Governor G. Mayor? H. Others? 
14. \Vhat communication methods might your distiict use to maintain contact with 
staff and students during long-tenn school closure? (Write your response) 
15. Should BOCES coordinate a county-wide task force comprised ofrepresentatives 
from all County school districts to address the issue of pandemic planning and 
emergency preparedness? 
Yes D No D 
Jf yes, how may this be accomplished? 
lfno, why 
not? 
Not Sure D 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
16. What critical functions will need to continue when schools close for long periods? 
(Circle all that apply) 
A. School facilities (phones, boilers, energy management, etc) B. Computer 
services/email C. Payroll services D. Business Services E. Alternative 
Instruction F. Transportation G. Communications/public relations 
H. School Administration I. Custodial services J. Food services 
K. List others that come to mind L. Mail Services M. Other? 
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17. How will the critical functions listed in # 16 above be implemented? 
18. Please circle the school district that you represent: Not provided for 
confidentiality purposes 
19. Please take a moment and provide any suggestions that you believe are important 
regarding pandemic preparedness and long-term school closure as it relates to 
your school district. 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
Once the survey results are compiled we will share them with you. 
115 
Appendix C 
Face-to-Face Interview Questions 
1. Questions 6 - 8 of the superintendent survey were related to the potential for a 
pandemic event, requiring long-tenn school closure, occurring within 1, 5 or 10 
years. The survey results indicated that 98% of the superintendents do not believe 
it will occur within one year, 72% do not believe it will occur in five years and 63 
% do not believe that it will occur in I 0 years. 
a. Why do you believe that the majority of local school superintendents do 
not believe a pandemic will occur that causes long-term school closure 
within the next 10 years? 
2. The survey revealed that about Yi of the superintendents believe that a school 
board policy related to long-term school closure is necessary, while the other Yi 
do not believe a board policy is necessary. 
a. Why do you believe Yi of the superintendents' feel a policy is needed and 
the other Yi do not? 
b. What do you advise? 
3. Current CDC guidelines suggest that schools incorporate into their pandemic 
influenza plans a process to address students with special needs (e.g., low income 
students who rely on the school food service for daily meals). 100% of the 
superintendent survey respondents disagreed that schools have a responsibility to 
feed students who rely on free and reduced lunch while schools are closed for 
extended periods. 
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a. Why? 
4. 63% of the superintendents surveyed agree that at least once a year students, 
faculty and staff should receive training on the use of non-medical ways to reduce 
the spread of influenza, such as covering coughs and sneezes, washing hands and 
staying home if your are sick. Approximately 40% of the superintendents 
surveyed did not believe this training is necessary. 
a. Why do you think many superintendents do believe this training is 
necessary and some do not? 
b. What do you advise? 
5. 43% of Superintendents believe BOCES should coordinate a countywide task 
force to address pandemic planning, while 38% do not. 25% of superintendents 
are not sure whether or not BOCES should coordinate such a task force. Those 
superintendents who do not think BOCES should coordinate a task force believe 
pandemic planning for schools should be incorporated into the county" s plan. 
a. What do you advise? 
b. If you believe BOCES should continue to coordinate a task force on 
pandemic planning, what do you think the charge of the task force should 
be for the coming year? 
c. How should the task force communicate their efforts to county school 
superintendents? 
6. 94% ofrespondents believed that interagency collaboration to ensure responses 
between school districts, BOCES, county health department and other agencies 
wi ll be necessary before, during and after a pandemic. 
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a. What methods do you believe should be used to notify school 
superintendents of pandemic planning effo1ts conducted by outside 
agencies, e.g., county health department and county emergency 
management office? 
7. If a flu pandemic were to happen tomoITow in our county what procedures would 
be in place for schools? 
a. What procedures are still needed? 
b. What could be done to address any identified need? 
8. Is there anything else you would like to say about the implications regarding long-
tem1 school closure or pandemic planning? 
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Appendix D 
Interview and Focus Group Questions/Moderator's Guide 
The researcher will ask the following questions during individual interviews and while 
facilitating a focus group: 
1. Tell me about your experience with the BOCES Pandemic Planning Task Force 
thus far. 
a. What has the task force produced thus far? 
b. What have been the successes of the group? 
c. What else could the task force have done, if anything, in the last year? 
2. What do you think the charge of this task force should be in this next year? 
a. How much direction do we need from school superintendents? 
b. How can we get them to buy in and support the work of the task force? 
3. In what ways, if any, can this task force be more representative of County Schools 
or other agencies that may be affected by school closures? 
a. Westside BOCES districts? 
b. Other Agencies? 
4. If a flu pandemic were to happen tomorrow in our County what procedures would 
be in place for schools? 
a. What procedures are still needed? 
b. What could be done to address any identified need? 
Is there anything else that you would like to say about the implications regarding 
long-term school closure, the task force's work, or pandemic planning? 
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Appendix E 
Additional BOCES background info1mation 
Almost 50 years ago, New York State created Boards of Cooperative Educational 
Services, or BOCES, as cost-effective regional partnerships linking rural and suburban 
school districts. They provide districts with "the BOCES advantage." Each BOCES is a 
cooperative extension of its component school districts. BOC ES provides services to 
component school districts and working together provide programs and services that 
individually they would not otherwise be able to offer. Shared services give school 
districts a major economic advantage including a greater cost savings. 
BOC ES supervisory districts are sub-regions of New York State created to improve the 
overall supervision oflocal schools. In 1967 legislation was passed that allowed BOCES 
to construct and own facilities with voter approval and to use the Donnitory Authority of 
the State of New York to finance the cost of facilities. As a result BOC ES services began 
to expand, as most BOCES constructed buildings with classrooms and shops having 
state-of-the-art equipment. Subsequent legislation was adopted authorizing BOCES to 
provide data processing services for schools on a multi-BOCES basis. School districts 
began requesting other services such as computer-assisted instructional services, planning 
and staff development services, and programs for adults. BOCES services continued to 
grow through the 1970s and by 1980 most school districts in the state were a member of a 
BOCES. In the early 1980s BOCES were given the authority to operate academic 
programs such as summer school and alternative high school. Beginning in the mid-
1980" s some BOCES began to offer component school districts with environmental 
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